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Both external and internal inspectors typically select audit engagements to inspect using a 
risk-based approach (i.e. they pick those they predict are more likely to have deficiencies). While 
reducing the amount of resources needed to find audit deficiencies, this approach can perversely 
influence the behavior of non-inspected auditors who read the inspection feedback. Using social 
identity theory and attribution theory, I predict that auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback 
depends on whose engagements are inspected (more vs. less closely affiliated auditors) and how 
the engagements are selected (risk vs. random basis). I predict and find that auditors identify 
more strongly with the inspected auditors when inspections are risk-based or pertain to more 
closely affiliated auditors (e.g., same office). This stronger identification triggers defensive 
attributions, decreasing the perceived value of the report, and reducing the degree to which they 
employ corrective action that addresses inspector feedback in their own audits. Random selection 
is more neutral in nature, reducing identification and improving incorporation of inspection 
feedback, but only when the feedback is for less closely affiliated auditors. Implications for 
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 United States and international auditing standards require audit firms to monitor and 
maintain a system of quality control that provides reasonable assurance firm personnel are in 
compliance with applicable professional standards and firm policies (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, and 
Jenkins 2008; ISQC 1; QC 20, 30). A key monitoring mechanism used by firms is ex post audit 
inspections, also known as Internal Quality Reviews (IQRs) (Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith 
2010; Houston and Stefaniak 2013). In an IQR, an inspection team from within the audit firm 
reviews the working papers of a selected audit engagement and assesses whether the audit was 
compliant with policies and standards (BDO 2017; Houston and Stefaniak 2013). The inspectors 
communicate results to firm leadership, who disseminate findings to the assurance practice 
through technical updates, training, and guidance (Grant Thornton 2017; Johnson, Keune, and 
Winchel 2017; KPMG 2017; PwC 2017). These communications may be at the firm, region, and 
office level (Bedard et al. 2010). Auditors across the firm are expected to modify their audit 
plans and procedures in response to this feedback, as needed (EY 2017; Johnson et al. 2017).   
In recent years, many audit firms have attempted to prevent regulator-identified 
deficiencies by adjusting their internal inspection programs to mirror external regulatory 
inspections (Bedard et al. 2010; Houston and Stefaniak 2013; Johnson et al. 2017; Wedemeyer 
2014). Like the regulators, several firms now principally select engagements for inspection using 
a risk-based approach, meaning they intentionally select engagements where deficiencies are 
more likely to be present (Bedard et al. 2010; Houston and Stefaniak 2013), rather than selecting 
a representative sample (Aobdia 2018; Bell, Causholli, and Knechel 2015). Additionally, IQR 
feedback is regularly being pushed down to auditors to incorporate in their audits (Johnson et al. 
2017). This feedback may be specific to the office where the auditors work (Grant Thornton 
2 
 
2017) or share information about performance at other offices (Houston and Stefaniak 2013). 
These institutional features are important because they can affect how effectively auditors 
incorporate the inspection feedback communicated to them.  
In this study, I examine the joint effect of two key features of inspections on auditors’ 
effective use of inspection feedback. Specifically, I study the effect of Selection Basis (i.e., how 
engagements are selected for inspection) and Group Affiliation (i.e., the nominal relationship of 
the auditor reading the feedback with the inspected auditors). Using social identity theory, I 
predict that non-inspected auditors (i.e., auditors who receive IQR feedback communications, but 
were not inspected in the cycle covered by the feedback) will identify more closely with the 
inspected auditors either when the inspection is more targeted at finding errors (e.g., risk-based) 
or covers a closely affiliated group (e.g., their office), leading them to make more defensive 
attributions about the feedback and not incorporate it as effectively into their work. However, a 
more neutral selection basis, such as random inspections, does not provoke the same degree of 
identification and can improve the auditors’ effective use of feedback, provided that the feedback 
is also for a less closely affiliated group (e.g., another office).  
It is important to examine how these factors affect auditors’ effective use of IQR 
feedback for at least two reasons. One, IQR outcomes are important to audit firms, auditors, 
investors, and regulators. Auditors and investors consider IQR results to be a key indicator of 
audit quality (Christensen, Glover, Omer, and Shelley 2016) and IQR findings are correlated 
with deficiencies identified by external regulators (Aobdia 2018). Additionally, audit firms 
include IQR outcomes in annual performance evaluations (Bedard et al. 2010), affecting 
auditors’ compensation, reputation, and promotion potential (Houston and Stefaniak 2013). 
Therefore, it is arguably in these parties’ best interest to understand how features of IQRs can 
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affect future IQR and external inspection outcomes. Two, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), which serves as the principal external inspector of public accounting 
firms in the U.S., recently began conducting a limited number of inspections on a random basis 
(PCAOB 2016, 2017). Since internal inspections tend to imitate external inspections (Houston 
and Stefaniak 2013; Johnson et al. 2017), it is critical to understand whether and how such a 
change will affect auditor behavior, in particular, auditors’ use of inspection feedback.  
I formulate my predictions about the joint effect of these two variables using social 
identity theory and attribution theory. Social identity theory posits that perceived discrimination 
against an individual’s group increases that individual’s identification with the group 
(Branscombe and Ellemers 1998; Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999; Jetten et al. 2001; 
Lüders et al. 2016). Since risk-based inspections are designed to test areas where auditing 
deficiencies are more likely to be present, I contend that the non-inspected auditors will view 
these inspections as targeting their fellow auditors, leading to stronger identification with them. 
Random inspections are more neutral in nature and do not elicit the same degree of 
identification, but only if the non-inspected auditor does not already identify strongly with the 
inspected auditors through their level of group affiliation (e.g., by working in the same office).  
The level of identification non-inspected auditors experience with the inspected auditors 
is important because group identification is a key factor in determining attributions in the 
presence of failure. Group-serving attributional bias describes the tendency of individuals to 
attribute their group’s positive outcomes to more internal, stable, and global causes and negative 
outcomes to more external, unstable, and specific causes (Forsyth and Schlenker 1977; Islam and 
Hewstone 1993; Mezulis et al. 2004). Given that most inspection feedback is negative in nature, 
the predicted stronger identification with risk-based or closely affiliated inspected auditors would 
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lead auditors to attribute the inspectors’ reported audit deficiencies more to external, unstable, 
and specific causes, and less to internal, stable, and global causes. Attributing the discovered 
deficiencies in this way will lead auditors to discount the value of the inspection feedback and 
less fully incorporate that feedback in their future audit work (Beyer et al. 2017; Hernandez 
2012; Rotter 1966). However, the use of random selection can alleviate these tendencies and lead 
to better incorporation of the feedback, provided the auditor is also not closely affiliated with the 
inspected auditors. In sum, I expect Selection Basis and Group Affiliation to form an ordinal 
interaction, such that non-inspected auditors most effectively incorporate inspection feedback 
when the feedback is based on random inspections that pertain to a less closely affiliated group.   
To test this theory, I conduct an experiment designed to evaluate auditors’ effective use 
of inspection feedback. I present professional auditors at the senior associate level with an audit 
case where their task is to review a working paper prepared by a staff member concerning an 
accounting estimate. Prior to beginning the case, participants are told that they work in Home 
Office at a fictitious audit firm and are asked to read a memorandum detailing recent IQR results 
either for their office or another office at their firm (stronger or weaker group affiliation, 
respectively). The report also describes the inspection selection basis as either risk-weighted or 
random using language from recent inspection reports. The listed audit deficiencies are identical 
between all conditions and are mostly based on commonly recurring PCAOB inspection report 
findings, which are correlated with IQR findings (Aobdia 2018; Deloitte 2016).  
In the experiment, participants complete the audit case after reviewing the inspection 
report. They first read background information, including the control processes and firm policies 
surrounding the accounting estimate, and then they review a working paper prepared by a 
fictitious audit staff member to test the estimate. Participants are asked to provide review 
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comments and then to assess the likelihood that the account is misstated and the likelihood that a 
control deficiency exists. A key feature of my design is that deficiencies identified in the 
inspection report are also seeded in the working paper. Accordingly, the main measure of 
effective use of inspection feedback is whether the auditors detect and correct these seeded errors 
(especially those buried deeper within the inspector’s report), as evidenced by their review 
comments, and their subsequent judgments of the likelihood of a misstatement and/or internal 
control deficiency. I post-experimentally measure participants’ group identification, attributions, 
and perceived inspection report value to further test the proposed theory in addition to 
demographic information and measures to rule out potential alternative explanations.  
Consistent with my predictions, non-inspected auditors who read a random-based 
inspection report for less closely affiliated auditors correctly identify the issue buried deepest in 
the inspection report (a deficiency related to auditing internal controls) significantly more often 
and assess the likelihood of a significant control deficiency to be significantly higher than 
auditors who read either a risk-based inspection report or a report for more closely affiliated 
auditors. The proposed theoretical judgment process - that risk-based inspections and stronger 
group affiliation result in stronger identification with the inspected auditors, ultimately 
decreasing receptiveness to inspection feedback - is also supported using mediation analysis.    
This study contributes to a growing literature on the effects of inspections on subsequent 
auditor behavior. To my knowledge, it is the first to examine auditors’ effectiveness in 
incorporating inspection feedback into their work and one of the first to investigate the effects of 
IQRs on auditor behavior. While IQRs have been mentioned in commentaries (e.g., Bedard et al. 
2010; Wedemeyer 2014), literature reviews (e.g., Bedard et al. 2008), and interview studies 
(Johnson et al. 2017), not much existing work has directly addressed the role of IQRs in the audit 
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profession. To date, there have been two surveys investigating auditors’ views on IQRs 
(Christensen et al. 2016; Houston and Stefaniak 2013). Christensen et al. (2016) ask auditors and 
investors about IQRs briefly, in the context of understanding their views on audit quality 
indicators, while Houston and Stefaniak (2013) ask audit partners several questions about the 
predictability, conduct, reviewer qualifications, and effects of IQRs in comparison to PCAOB 
inspections. Stefaniak, Houston, and Brandon (2017) follow up the survey with an experimental 
study examining how the anticipation of an IQR can affect auditor planning decisions. Similarly, 
in a PCAOB inspection setting, Bhaskar (2017) and McCallen and Kang (2017) investigate the 
effect of a risk-based selection regime on auditor resource allocation for high- and low-risk 
clients. However, it is still an open question how auditors respond to feedback (i.e. what 
specifically went wrong) when performing a subsequent audit.  
This study also contributes to the psychology literature. While the literature on social 
identity theory and self-serving attribution bias is large, this is the first study, to my knowledge, 
to show how selection basis affects identity and attributions. It is important to investigate this 
relationship, as it not only has implications for regulators and auditors, but also for other 
inspection settings, such as drug testing of athletes. This study also contributes to our 
understanding of the robustness of group-serving attribution bias. To my knowledge, no studies 
exist examining whether this bias persists when the group member making the attributions did 
not participate in the events leading to the negative outcome. This finding has important 
implications for auditors and regulators since most practitioner consumers of inspection reports 
are not the individuals who were inspected in that year.  
This study also has practical implications for audit firms, by justifying the dissemination 
of inspection results outside the immediate group who was inspected and by supporting potential 
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changes to firms’ selection basis choices. Additionally, the theory in this study is relevant to the 
PCAOB inspection setting, where the inspection selection basis is becoming less risk-based with 
the recent limited introduction of random selection and where inspection reports are available at 
various levels of group affiliation (e.g., same or different firm or affiliate). The substitution of an 
external inspector, who is considered to be more adversarial than internal inspectors (Houston 
and Stefaniak 2013), would be expected only to amplify the hypothesized relationships between 
selection basis, group affiliation, and receptiveness to feedback, but not to eliminate or change 




2. BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 INTERNAL QUALITY REVIEW PROCESS 
 Audit standards require that audit firms maintain and monitor a system of quality control that 
ensures firm personnel are in compliance with applicable professional standards (QC 20). In partial 
fulfillment of the monitoring requirement, many audit firms perform ex post inspections of audit 
engagements (BDO 2017; Deloitte 2016; EY 2017; Grant Thornton 2017; Houston and Stefaniak 
2013; KPMG 2017; PwC 2017). These internal quality reviews (IQRs) are performed periodically by 
other audit firm members (either active auditors or dedicated inspectors) who are independent of the 
inspected engagement, with each firm partner typically being inspected every three to four years 
(Bedard et al. 2010; Houston and Stefaniak 2013; PwC 2017). Not much literature currently exists on 
internal inspections (Bedard et al. 2008; Houston and Stefaniak 2013), likely due to the lack of 
visibility of the process and outcomes outside the accounting firms. To shed some light on this 
practice, Houston and Stefaniak (2013) survey several partners at large audit firms about their 
perceptions of both internal and external inspections. Regarding the effects of IQRs, they find that 
partners believe internal inspection results affect promotions, compensation, and their professional 
reputation. In a follow-up experiment, Stefaniak et al. (2017) find that anticipation of either an 
internal or external inspection leads to higher assessments of perceived engagement risk, greater 
planned effort, and increased fees compared to auditors who do not anticipate an inspection.   
 A key trend in IQR programs over recent years is that they have been changing to align more 
closely with external inspections, such as those conducted by the PCAOB (Bedard et al. 2010; 
Wedemeyer 2014). For example, in an interview about PCAOB inspections, one auditor states that 
their firm’s IQR program has “moved in relationship with the PCAOB. It’s gotten far more critical 
and far more detailed” (Johnson et al. 2017, p. 25). Johnson et al. (2017) further note that their 
participants, as a whole, emphasized the “enhanced stringency” of IQR programs to “obtain clean 
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inspection reports” from the PCAOB. This description matches open-ended survey responses 
collected by Houston and Stefaniak (2013), where participants state that IQRs are “more rigorous,” 
“very detailed,” and in “overkill mode” because of “paranoia about not finding something in 
anticipation of a PCAOB review” (p. 37). Two ways that audit firms have shifted their IQR programs 
to avert external inspection findings is by increasing communications of inspection results to audit 
firm members and by aligning their selection basis with the criteria used by the external inspectors.  
2.1.1 Inspection Results Communication and Group Affiliation 
        Quality control standards require that any findings identified in the internal inspection 
process be communicated to appropriate firm management personnel (QC 30). Firm leadership then 
uses this information to tailor firm communications (e.g., technical updates), tools, and trainings, for 
the assurance practice (BDO 2017; KPMG 2017; PwC 2017). IQR findings are communicated 
regularly to firm personnel throughout the year to promote timely incorporation of the feedback into 
current audits (EY 2017; Johnson et al. 2017). These findings may be analyzed at the region, industry 
area, and office level (Bedard et al. 2010) and may be communicated to the specific office where 
issues occurred (Grant Thornton 2017) or shared with other offices (Houston and Stefaniak 2013). 
Therefore, auditors who receive the inspection feedback may be more or less closely affiliated with 
the auditors whose inspection results are detailed in a given report.   
2.1.2 Internal Quality Review Selection Basis  
In response to the PCAOB, audit firms have increased their use of targeted reviews (Bedard 
et al. 2010), meaning that they select the engagements where they believe audit deficiencies are most 
likely to be present. Houston and Stefaniak (2013) find that, on average, auditors believe 
engagements are selected for an IQR based on specific risk factors and are not chosen randomly. This 
general perception is confirmed by recent annual audit quality reports released by large audit firms, 
who directly state that they base their selection on risk (e.g. BDO 2017; KPMG 2017), and by two 
archival studies using proprietary internal inspection data. Aobdia (2018) uses inspection data from 
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the seven largest audit firms. He specifically states that internal inspections are not randomly chosen 
and that internally inspected firms are larger than typical engagements, on average. Bell et al. (2015) 
use data from one Big 4 firm, and report that the firm selects 50% of their inspection sample 
randomly, but that the remaining 50% are selected based on auditor business risk and audit risk. 
However, some Big 4 firms have recently indicated that they seek to select a representative sample of 
their audit practice (e.g., PwC 2017) or no longer state that they use a risk-based approach (e.g., EY 
2017). Therefore, variation appears to exist across firms for the selection basis used for internal 
inspections. 
In recent years, there have been some survey and interview studies that assess the potential 
effects of risk-based inspections on auditors (Daugherty and Tervo 2010; Dowling, Knechel, and 
Moroney 2015; Houston and Stefaniak 2013; Johnson et al. 2017). Dowling et al. (2015) and 
Johnson et al. (2017) find that auditors are concerned about the generalizability of issues discovered 
on a risk-basis. They are also concerned that risk-based inspections encourage inspectors to form 
biased conclusions since they only investigate where they believe deficiencies will exist (Peecher, 
Solomon, and Trotman 2013). Dowling et al. (2015) go further to report that auditors believe the 
risk-based selection process increases the likelihood of negative findings and serves to justify the 
regulator’s power over the auditing profession. Johnson et al. (2017) similarly find that the “pointed 
approach” of risk-based inspections leads some auditors to believe that “inspectors are targeting them 
and inspection findings are inevitable” (p. 36).  
Using experimental methods, Bhaskar (2017) seeks to establish a causal relationship between 
risk-based inspections and auditor decisions. Specifically, she uses student participants in an abstract 
setting to examine how the presence of a risk-based inspection affects auditor effort allocation 
decisions and performance. She finds that auditor-participants tend to allocate more resources toward 
their higher-risk client when facing a risk-based inspection and that effort and decision quality 
deteriorate for their lower-risk client compared to a control of no inspection. McCallen and Kang 
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(2017) further refine this relationship by showing that auditors focus on clients subject to higher 
inspection risk (vs. audit risk) when they anticipate areas of focus for the next inspection cycle. I 
propose that risk-based selection can also affect how auditors learn from feedback provided in the 
inspection process. While not examined in the current literature, it is reasonable to conceive that a 
more neutral selection basis, such as random selection, would alleviate the negative feelings and 
effects of risk-based inspections found in prior literature and therefore improve auditors’ acceptance 
and use of feedback produced in the inspection process.   
2.2 USE OF FEEDBACK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT   
2.2.1 Effect of Identification with the Inspected Auditors 
Using social identity theory and attribution theory, I posit that group affiliation and selection 
basis can influence auditors’ success in adequately correcting deficiencies identified in inspection 
reports. Social identity theory describes “the role of self and identity in group and intergroup 
phenomena” (Hogg 2016, p. 3) where social identity is defined as an “individual’s knowledge that he 
belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this 
group membership” (Tajfel 1972, p. 292, as quoted in Hogg 2016). While it is common to think of 
social or group identity in terms of an “in-group” and “out-group,” individuals often simultaneously 
identify with multiple groups and sub-groups (Ashforth and Mael 1989). For auditors, their relevant 
social identities could come from their engagement team, office, industry group, firm, firm peer 
group, and/or the auditing profession at-large (e.g., Bauer 2015; King 2002), with the expectation 
being that more immediate (i.e., more closely affiliated) groups are more salient to the individual 
auditor (Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley 2008; Brown 1969).  
How auditors identify with the inspected auditors is important because prior research has 
shown it affects how they will attribute the identified deficiencies. A well-known bias within 
attribution theory is self-serving attributional bias, which has also been extended to group-
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serving attributional bias (Forsyth and Schlenker 1977; Islam and Hewstone 1993). Self-serving 
(group-serving) attributional bias describes the tendency of individuals to attribute their own 
(group’s) positive outcomes to more internal, stable, and global causes and negative events to 
more external, unstable, and specific causes (e.g., Mezulis et al. 2004). Inspection reports 
typically only include audit deficiencies, meaning that inspections only constitute negative 
events, or at best, neutral events (i.e., no deficiencies found). This suggests that auditors will tend 
to attribute inspection results to more external, unstable, and specific causes and less to internal, 
stable, and global causes when they identify more closely with the inspected auditors.
1
 When 
auditors do not attribute the audit deficiencies to internal, stable causes, they are more likely to 
discount the value of the feedback because they do not think it represents the quality of the 
inspected auditors (Beyer et al. 2017; Hernandez 2012; Rotter 1966). Accordingly, they are less 
likely to carefully read and process the inspection feedback (especially feedback buried deeper in 
the report) and effectively incorporate the feedback in their own audit work.   
2.2.2 Joint Effect of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation 
One relevant prediction of social identity theory is that the presence of perceived prejudice or 
threats against one’s group increases members’ identification with that group (Branscombe and 
Ellemers 1998; Branscombe et al. 1999; Jetten et al. 2001; Turner et al. 1984). While identifying 
with a threatened group may seem psychologically harmful, the current belief is that individuals 
increase identification as a coping mechanism, allowing them to decrease the anxiety induced by the 
                                                 
1
 Although reactions to IQR feedback is not publicly available, this attribution pattern is consistent with audit firm 
responses to PCAOB inspection findings. According to the PCAOB, such responses include “it was just a 
documentation problem” (unstable cause) and “there was a difference in professional judgment” (external cause) 
(PCAOB 2012, p. ii). Ege, Knechel, and Lamoreaux (2017) examine audit firms’ formal public responses to 
PCAOB inspection reports over time and notice that early (2004-2008) responses were negative in tone, often 
labelling identified deficiencies as incorrect or unfair. These labels are consistent with external attributions of the 
negative findings, regardless of the legitimacy of these concerns. Although more recent firm responses have carried 
a more positive tone, Ege et al. (2017) suggest that this change could be a reaction to PCAOB inspectors being more 
critical after the audit firm has issued a negative response letter. 
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perceived threat and maintain their need for belonging and control (Lüders et al. 2016). I contend 
that key features of IQRs can especially evoke this increased sense of identity.  
With some exceptions, internal inspections are largely being conducted on a risk-basis. 
Consistent with interview findings, I posit that this approach could be viewed by auditors as 
threatening to their group. Inspectors in a risk-based regime intentionally choose areas and 
engagements for inspection where they believe they are most likely to find deficiencies, yet these 
deficiencies have important reputational and financial consequences for auditors (Houston and 
Stefaniak 2013; Johnson et al. 2017). They threaten their very livelihood as auditors. In contrast, 
random-based inspections are designed to obtain a representative sample. This approach is more 
neutral in terms of perceived inspector intent to find errors. Therefore, it is reasonable that 
auditors would perceive their group to be less threatened under a random-based regime and, 
consequently, identify less with inspected auditors in that setting and more effectively 
incorporate the inspection feedback in their work than in a risk-based regime.        
While I predict auditors will more effectively incorporate inspection feedback into their 
audits in a random-based inspection regime, there are other key institutional features of audit 
inspection reporting that can negate its effects. Inspection findings are often reported at the group 
level (Bedard et al. 2010; Grant Thornton 2017). One result of reporting at the group-level is that 
it generates natural variation in how strongly a given auditor identifies with the inspected group. 
An auditor may identify with multiple groups within the profession (Ashforth and Mael 1989), 
but they are likely to identify more strongly with their more immediate groups (Ashforth et al. 
2008; Brown 1969). Thus, the increased effectiveness in incorporating feedback expected in a 
random-based regime will be offset by the increased identification with the inspected auditors 
when the auditor’s more closely affiliated group is inspected.  
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In summary, I predict selection basis and group affiliation will form an ordinal 
interaction, such that non-inspected auditors most effectively incorporate inspection feedback 
when the feedback is based on random inspections that cover less closely affiliated auditors and 
least otherwise. I do not predict a main effect of the selection basis or group affiliation because 
prior literature has not supported the notion that threats to identity are additive. In other words, 
experiencing multiple identity threats does not increase identification or deteriorate performance 
more than experiencing a single threat (e.g., Davis, Aronson, and Salinas 2006; Stone and 
McWhinnie 2008; Tine and Gotlieb 2013; Turner et al. 1992; Ullrich, Christ, and Schlüter 2006). 
Together, this leads to the following hypothesis:                      
 
H1: Selection basis and group affiliation will interactively affect auditors’ effective use of 
inspection feedback such that effective use is greatest in a random inspection regime 
when the inspected auditors are less closely affiliated with the auditor reading the 
feedback and lowest when inspections are risk-based or the inspected auditors are 
more closely affiliated.  
 
See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of this prediction. I further predict that this 
relationship is mediated by the joint effect of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation on 
identification with the inspected auditors, which ultimately reduces auditors’ effective use of 
inspection feedback. This prediction is formalized in the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The interactive effect of selection basis and group affiliation is mediated by 
identification with the inspected auditors.  
 
 While these predictions are supported by psychology theory, it is possible that auditors 
will more effectively incorporate inspection feedback that is risk-based or for closely affiliated 
auditors because this feedback is arguably more diagnostic of future audit deficiencies. To the 
extent that inspectors accurately identify areas where the risk of audit deficiencies is greatest, 
feedback from risk-based inspections is more helpful for auditors who wish to avoid future 
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deficiencies. Likewise, feedback for more closely affiliated auditors is conceivably more relevant 
for avoiding deficiencies because more closely affiliated auditors are similarly trained and use 
similar methodology. By this reasoning, rational auditors who aim to avoid audit deficiencies 
should most effectively use feedback from inspections performed on a risk-basis for closely 
affiliated auditors. However, given the increasingly intense nature of IQRs in recent years 
(Houston and Stefaniak 2013; Johnson et al. 2017), it is highly plausible that auditors’ defensive 
reactions will overcome attempts to rationally respond to inspection feedback.   
 





3.1 PARTICIPANTS  
 I use professional auditor participants at the senior associate level to test my theory. Since 
the main task in the experiment is to complete an audit case where they are asked to provide 
review comments for working papers on an accounting estimate, senior associates should have 
the appropriate amount of experience reasonably required to complete this task (Griffith, 
Hammersley, and Kadous 2015).  
I collect 103 responses from senior associates at two Big 4 accounting firms. I drop two 
responses where participants left the review comments page and several other questions blank 
since completion of the audit case is critical to understanding whether the participants responded 
to the inspection feedback, leaving a remaining sample of 101 auditors. The remaining auditors 
in the sample have an average (standard deviation) of 25.0 (15.3) months of experience in 
assurance services, have prepared auditing workpapers for an accounting estimate 6.4 (8.0) times 
and reviewed workpapers for an accounting estimate 2.1 (5.4) times (See Table 1). Participants 
appear to possess sufficient experience to complete this task.  
3.2 TASK 
 Professional auditor participants are presented with an audit case for their client, Cool 
Beans, a fictitious roaster and seller of coffee beans. After reading through an inspection report 
unrelated to the Cool Beans audit (described later), the auditors learn about the medical claims 
process for Cool Beans, which is self-insured. Their task is to review a working paper prepared 
by an audit staff member to test management’s estimate of incurred but not reported (IBNR) 
medical claims that need to be reserved at year-end. Participants are asked to provide review 
comments as they would on a typical audit engagement and then to assess the likelihood that a 
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material misstatement or internal control deficiency exists for this accounting estimate. This 
method is similar to Ismail and Trotman (1995) except that the working paper is identical for all 
reviewer participants.   
A key design feature is that the working paper is seeded with errors that are aligned with 
the deficiencies in the inspection report (see Appendix A for details). These deficiencies are 
drawn from current PCAOB inspection reports for Big 4 accounting firms and generally 
represent common recurring issues. The deficiencies range from more judgmental (#1 and #4) to 
more technical (#2 and #3) in nature.
2
 The four principal deficiencies in the inspection report are 
(1) failure to evaluate the reasonableness of significant assumptions, (2) failure to test the 
completeness and accuracy of data used, (3) failure to identify a formula error in a spreadsheet, 
and (4) failure to evaluate how internal control exceptions are addressed. These four deficiencies 
are aligned with failures within the working paper to (1) assess the reasonableness of the reserve 
rate used by management, (2) verify that medical claims data used in the estimate is accurate and 
complete, (3) identify a mathematical error in the calculation, and (4) follow up on a deviation 
from company policy. The working paper also includes non-inspection related seeded 
documentation errors, such as typos and omitted descriptions, to determine if the inspection 
reports orient the auditor toward a documentation focus (Winn 2015). See Appendix B for the 
full experimental instrument and Appendix C for approval by the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.       
 
                                                 
2
 I vary the nature of the deficiencies as technical or judgmental because auditors have previously claimed that 
deficiencies found by inspectors represent differences in judgment rather than objective errors (Ege et al. 2017; 
PCAOB 2012). By including more technical-type deficiencies, I can examine whether my theory generalizes beyond 
disputes in judgment, where auditors arguably feel most threatened by inspectors, to determine if it also affects their 
incorporation of technical issues. I alternate the order of the type of issue within the inspection report (i.e., first is 
calculation error (technical), second is reserve rate assumptions (judgmental), third is checking completeness and 
accuracy of data (technical), and fourth is detecting an internal control deficiency (judgmental)) so that the issue-
type is not confounded with its placement within the inspection report.    
18 
 
3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The two independent variables (Selection Basis and Group Affiliation) are manipulated 
within the inspection report that participants read prior to beginning the main task. 
3.3.1 Selection Basis 
Selection Basis is manipulated at two levels (risk-weighted vs. random). Since examples 
of internal inspection reports are not publicly available, I use PCAOB inspection reports as a 
guide for creating the IQR results memorandum. This approach is justified by auditors’ claims 
that IQRs are becoming increasingly similar to PCAOB inspections (Houston and Stefaniak 
2013; Johnson et al. 2017). In line with PCAOB practices, participants are alerted to the 
engagement selection approach within a separate section in the report entitled “Engagement 
Selection Approach.” The language used to describe the selection basis is also based on current 
PCAOB inspection reports. See below for the exact language included in the experimental 
materials, except that I add boldface here.  
Risk-weighted basis 
Individual audits and areas of review focus were selected on a risk-weighted basis. 
Thus, the audit work is generally selected for inspection based on factors that heighten 
the possibility that auditing deficiencies are present.  
 
Random basis 
Individual audits and areas of review focus are selected on a random basis. Thus, the 
audit work is generally selected for inspection through a process intended to identify a 
representative sample. 
 
The section with the inspection findings is also titled, “Identified Deficiencies in Risk-
Weighted (Random) Sample” and includes a reminder that the engagements in the report were 





3.3.2 Group Affiliation 
 Before starting, participants are asked in a pre-case task to think about their real-life local 
office and briefly state some key features that they like about it. Participants are subsequently 
informed that they work for the fictitious accounting firm, Audit Firm LLP, and are based out of 
Home Office, which they should presume is very much like the office they described in the pre-
case task. This is similar to the method used by Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher (2013) to 
operationalize a social bond. Within the actual case, I manipulate the participants’ affiliation 
with the inspected group by stating that the internal inspection report relates to audits performed 
at Home Office (closely affiliated group) or Other Office (less closely affiliated group). See 
below for the exact language included in the experimental materials, except that I add boldface 
here.  
Closely Affiliated Group Less Closely Affiliated Group 
Prior to beginning the audit case, please read 
the following memorandum issued by 
leadership at your firm to all Audit Firm LLP 
assurance staff members regarding recent 
internal quality review findings at Home 
Office (the office where you work). 
Prior to beginning the audit case, please read 
the following memorandum issued by 
leadership at your firm to all Audit Firm LLP 
assurance staff members regarding recent 
internal quality review findings at Other 
Office (a different office from where you 
work). 
SUBJECT: Internal Quality Review Findings 
for Audits Performed at Home Office in 2016 
SUBJECT: Internal Quality Review Findings 
for Audits Performed at Other Office in 2016 
In 2016, the Audit Firm LLP Internal Quality 
Review team conducted reviews of several 
financial statement audits performed 
throughout the year at Home Office. 
In 2016, the Audit Firm LLP Internal Quality 
Review team conducted reviews of several 
financial statement audits performed 
throughout the year at Other Office. 
 
3.4 DEPENDENT MEASURES 
 Since I define effective incorporation of inspector feedback as processing feedback and 
applying it to future audits, the key dependent measure of interest is whether participants identify 
the seeded errors in the working paper that are aligned with the deficiencies in the inspection 
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report. Participants are provided space to provide review comments, where they can identify 
these and other issues. They also rank their review comments in order of priority at the 
conclusion of the case, prior to completing the post-experiment questionnaire.    
After writing their review notes, participants are asked to assess on a scale of 0-100 the 
likelihood that a material misstatement exists for the IBNR reserve estimate. They then provide 
an assessment of internal controls over financial reporting for the IBNR reserve on an 
unnumbered scale with 100 ticks, where 0 = No Control Deficiencies Likely, 33 = Control 
Deficiency Likely, 67 = Significant Deficiency Likely, and 100 = Material Weakness Likely. 
The idea is that the identification of the errors will aid the auditor in assessing the overall 
reasonableness of the estimate and how it was calculated.   
 In the post-experiment questionnaire, I collect measures of identification with Home 
Office, identification with the inspected auditors, participant attributions for the reported audit 
deficiencies, and assessments of report value. To assess identification, I use the well-validated 
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992; Bauer 2015; Tropp 
and Wright 2001), where participants choose which option of seven pairs of overlapping circles 
best represents how well their values align or overlap with the values of the auditors in Home 
Office or the auditors who were inspected. Options range from zero overlap to nearly complete 
overlap. To assess attributions, I ask participants to indicate the extent they agree that the 
deficiencies were received due to internal causes (e.g. ability and effort) and external causes (e.g. 
bad luck and client risk). I measure assessments of report value by asking the extent that auditors 
agree on a scale of 0-100 with the following statement, “Receiving an audit deficiency in an 
internal quality review reveals a lot about the quality of the work performed by the auditor under 
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review.” I also ask them to assess the likelihood their engagement will be selected for inspection 
this year and, lastly, I collect demographic information. 
Within the post-experiment questionnaire, I also ask participants to indicate in two binary 
multiple-choice questions whether the inspection report they read was risk-based or random and 
whether it pertained to auditors in their office or a different office. While these questions can 
serve as manipulation or attention checks, they also provide an additional test of theory. Since I 
predict that auditors will differentially attend to the information in the inspection report based on 
their condition, it is reasonable that auditors’ recall of the details of the inspection report will 
also vary by condition. This is consistent with prior literature, which has demonstrated that 
identity threats have a negative effect on working memory (Forbes and Schmader 2010; Tine and 





4.1 MANIPULATION CHECKS / PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THEORY 
 I assess whether participants attended to the selection basis manipulation by asking at the 
end of the study whether the inspection report they read at the beginning of the study discussed 
results from engagements chosen on a random or risk basis. Participants in the Risk Basis 
condition choose “risk” significantly more than those in the Random Basis condition (χ
2
(1)= 
11.51, p < 0.001), with 67% of participants choosing the correct selection basis. I also ask 
participants whether the inspection report discussed results from engagements at “Your office” 
or “A different office.” I find that those in the Home Office condition choose “Your office” 
significantly more than those in the Other Office condition (χ
2
(1) = 8.22, p = 0.004) with 65% of 
participants choosing the correct office (See Table 2, Panel E).  
It is not surprising that a sizeable proportion of participants do not recall details of the 
inspection report, especially since group identification can occur unconsciously (Otten and 
Wentura 1999) and the manipulations were subtle. Using subtle manipulations allows me to 
capture auditors’ natural reactions to the manipulated inspection features, without artificially 
drawing the participants’ attention to them. Additionally, as discussed in the Method section, it 
allows me to better determine if participants differentially recall details in the inspection report 
based on their condition. In line with H1, auditors in the Random/Other Office condition are 
expected to recall aspects of the report better than the auditors in the other three conditions. 
Therefore, as a preliminary test of theory, I examine whether auditors in this condition perform 
better on the two manipulation check questions. Consistent with this theory, I find that 
participants in the Random/Other Office condition recall both manipulations correctly more than 
the other three conditions (χ
2
(1) = 4.03, p = 0.02, one-tailed) (See Table 2, Panel D). When 
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considered in conjunction with the main hypotheses tests, this provides strong support that the 
participants internalized their assigned conditions, even if they could not explicitly recall them. 
Since I predict that the two independent variables will affect participants’ tendencies to 
recall manipulation check details, it is not appropriate to exclude participants who fail to recall 
them from the study. Therefore, I include all participants in my tests of hypotheses. I also include 
all participants on statistical grounds. Statistically, excluding participants based on post-
treatment variables creates a “biased estimation of the treatment effect among an endogenously 
selected group” (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018, p. 7) and “is equivalent to inducing 
differential attrition across treatment arms, which may induce bias of unknown sign and 
magnitude” (Aronow, Jonathon, and Pinson 2016, p. 1). Therefore, it would be inappropriate to 
exclude participants based on their ability to recall the manipulations.
3
        
4.2 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 H1 - Receptiveness to Inspection Feedback   
4.2.1.1 Identification of Errors 
 Participants complete an audit case where they review workpapers containing multiple 
seeded errors that are aligned with inspection report findings. Therefore, a key measure of 
effective use of inspection feedback is whether the auditors identified the seeded errors in their 
review notes. To facilitate this analysis, all review comments were coded and categorized 
according to the issue identified in the comment by the author and an independent coder, who 
                                                 
3
 Results for H1 are qualitatively similar when participants who miss the manipulation checks are excluded, but less 
statistically significant (See Tables 3 and 4). Specifically, when excluding participants who missed both 
manipulation checks, the one-tailed p-value of the planned contrast goes from p = 0.01 for identification of the 
seeded error to p = 0.05 and from p = 0.004 for judgments of the severity of the error to p = 0.13. Part of the 
reduction in significance is likely due to reduced power since excluding participants who missed the selection basis 
or group affiliation manipulation checks results in the attrition of over 50% of the total population. Therefore, I also 
create a variable capturing manipulation check performance (coded as a count of how many manipulation check 
questions they answer correctly) and include it in the respective logistic or ANOVA model for the whole population. 
I find that manipulation check performance has no effect on the dependent variables (all p > 0.76) and all follow-up 
contrast results are inferentially identical when this variable is included in each respective model.    
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were both blind to conditions. Both coders have at least 2 years of Big 4 audit experience and the 
independent coder also has 12 years of internal audit experience. The coders’ initial agreement 
was 66% (vs. 9% expected agreement) with a Cohen’s kappa of 0.63, indicating that the actual 
rate of agreement was significantly better than chance (p < 0.0001). The coders met and settled 
any differences. I use this final agreed coding to analyze the effects of the independent variables 
on participants’ identification of the seeded accounting issues. 
For the first two audit issues included in the inspection report (#1 and #3), I find no 
significant differences between conditions (all p > 0.56 for main and interactive effects).
4
 I do 
find significant effects, however, for the two audit issues that appear later in the inspection 
report (#2 and #4) (See Table 5, Panels D-F).
5
 This is consistent with auditors’ attention varying 
by condition as they read through the report. I focus on the seeded control issue (#4) in my main 
test of H1 since it is the last issue included in the inspection report and therefore provides the 
strongest test of theory.
6
  
The seeded control error arises in a footnote where the audit staff member who prepared 
the workpapers states that she discovered an immaterial difference between the reserve 
calculation provided by the client and the reserve amount in the general ledger. She notes that the 
                                                 
4
 I test this, and all tests including binary dependent variables, by first running a logistic regression. I then perform 
an ANOVA-style test (i.e., test for a contrast pattern of +1, -1, -1, +1) using the previously fitted logistic regression 
model. Any planned and follow-up contrast tests are also based on the logistic regression model.  
5
 In addition to testing the errors individually, I test this concept in aggregate. Specifically, I create two binary 
variables that are coded as one if the participant identifies error #1 or #3 (#2 or #4) and zero otherwise to examine 
differences in performance for errors presented earlier (later) in the inspection report. I find no differences between 
conditions for the Early Errors variable (all p > 0.20). Results for the Later Errors variable are consistent with the 
pattern predicted in H1 (χ²(1) = 6.12, p = 0.007, one-tailed) (see Table 5, Panels A-C).       
6
 As expected, results for error #2, the penultimate error, which pertains to testing the completeness and accuracy of 
data used as audit evidence, are similar to the results for error #4, but are less significant (See Table 5). Planned 
contrast tests reveal a significant ordinal interaction, such that auditors in the Random/Other condition identify this 
error more frequently than auditors in the other three conditions (χ
2
(1) = 3.02, p = 0.04, one-tailed). Follow-up simple 
effects tests show that the effect of Selection Basis is significant when the Other Office is inspected (χ
2
(1) = 3.94, p = 
0.02, one-tailed), but do not support a significant effect of Group Affiliation when the basis is Random (χ
2
(1) = 1.16, 
p = 0.14, one-tailed) (see Table 5, Panels D-F. This provides further evidence that the effect of the manipulations 
becomes stronger as the issue is buried deeper in the inspection report.  
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usual person who calculates the reserve was sick and an assistant calculated it incorrectly. 
Despite this, the audit staff member waives the difference as immaterial and does not recognize 
nor investigate any potential control issues. Since I predict a specific pattern of results, I test 
whether auditor participants in the Random/Other Office condition identified this error 
significantly more than the other three conditions (H1) using planned contrast weights of +3 for 
Random/Other Office and -1 for the remaining three conditions (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990) 
and include these results in Table 6. I find that auditors identify the seeded control issue most 
when they read inspection feedback for another office in a random-based inspection regime (χ
2
(1) 
= 5.26, p = 0.01, one-tailed). Follow-up simple effects also support this prediction and an 
approximation of the semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the 
main and interactive effects of selection basis and group affiliation after accounting for the 
planned contrast is not significant (F2,97 = 0.11; p = 0.89) and the contrast variance residual 
(Guggenmos, Agoglia, and Piercey 2018) indicates that only 3% of the between-cells variance is 
not explained by the tested contrast. See Figure 2, Panel A for a graphical depiction of these 
results. 
 Again, it is reasonable that differences in auditor incorporation of inspection feedback are 
most strongly revealed in relation to the seeded control issue because the audit deficiency related 
to control issues appears at the end of the inspection report. Since theory predicts that auditors 
who read a risk-based inspection report or a report for their own office will discount the value of 
the report, it makes sense that they will be less likely to carefully read all the way through the 
inspection report than auditors in the Random/Other Office condition. Therefore, they will also 
be less likely to incorporate the feedback buried deeper within the report. Nevertheless, I also 
compute a variable measuring a count of how many of the four seeded issues the auditors 
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identify (See Table 5, Panels A-C).
7
 Results of contrast testing based on Poisson regression 
reveal a marginally significant ordinal interaction (χ
2
(1) = 1.95, p = 0.08, one-tailed). However, 
the simple effects are not significant at conventional levels (all p > 0.12). It is not surprising that 
I only find marginal results using this measure, since differences between conditions are best 
identified where differential attention to the report is most likely to manifest (i.e., later in the 
feedback). Counting the number of identified issues can dampen this effect since it includes 
issues where auditors are expected to perform at similar levels.  
4.2.1.2 Audit Judgments 
 After reviewing the workpaper, participants assess the effectiveness of internal controls 
over the financial reporting processes for the reserve and the likelihood that the reviewed 
estimate is materially misstated. To test the effects of selection basis and group affiliation on 
each of these measures of audit judgment, I run an ANOVA and then use the same planned 
contrast coding used to test error identification (+3 for Random/Other Office, -1 for all other 
conditions). In line with the error identification results, I find that participants in the 
Random/Other Office condition assess the likelihood of a control deficiency to be significantly 
higher than those in the other three conditions (F1,94 = 7.43, p = 0.004, one-tailed), in support of 
H1 (see Table 7, Panel C). Follow-up simple effects also support this pattern and a semi-omnibus 
test confirms that the residual variation is not significant (F2,94 = 0.67; p = 0.52). The contrast 
variance residual indicates that only 15% of between-cells variance is not explained by the tested 
contrast. This provides evidence that auditors in this condition respond to inspection feedback 
                                                 
7
 While I do not observe differences between-participants in error identification for the first three seeded errors, I do 
observe differences within-participants. 36 (36%) of participants identify the staff auditor’s failure to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the reserve rate, 25 (25%) identify the failure to assess the completeness and accuracy of the data 
used to calculate the reserve; and 15 (15%) identify the seeded calculation error. In comparison, 31 (31%) of 
participants identified the seeded control error, which is mostly bolstered by the 50% of participants in the 
Random/Other Office condition who identified it (vs. 23% in the Home Office conditions and 28% in the Risk/Other 
Office condition) (see Table 5, Panel D).  
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through both their actions (i.e. writing a review note about the control issue) and judgments (i.e. 
assessing that the control issue matters). See Figure 2, Panel B for a graphical depiction of these 
results. 
 I also measure participants’ assessments of the likelihood that the reviewed estimate is 
materially misstated and test effects using an ANOVA test (see Table 8). I find that there is a 
significant main effect of group affiliation, such that auditors who read the inspection report for 
Other Office assess the likelihood of a material misstatement to be significantly higher than those 
who read a report for Home Office (F1,94 = 6.43, p = 0.01). While a planned contrast test is 
marginally significant (F1,94 = 2.36, p = 0.06, one-tailed), follow-up simple effects tests do not 
fully support this pattern. Simple effects show that the effect of group affiliation is stronger when 
the inspection is random (F1,94 = 4.32, p = 0.02, one-tailed) over risk-based (F1,94 = 1.65, p = 
0.20), but the simple effect for selection basis is not significant when the report is for Other 
Office (F1,94 = 0.04, p = 0.42, one-tailed). This indicates that participants in the Random/Other 
Office condition do not judge the likelihood of material misstatement to be higher than all the 
other conditions. Therefore, the results for participants’ judgments of the likelihood of material 
misstatement only partially support H1.  
A potential reason why the material misstatement assessment pattern differs from the 
control deficiency assessment outcome is that the seeded errors are less directly linked to a 
material misstatement than to a control deficiency. The seeded errors include two audit 
methodology issues (failure to assess the reasonableness of the reserve rate and failure to test that 
a key report was complete and accurate) and two immaterial calculation errors made by the 
client. While following up on these issues could lead to the discovery of a material misstatement, 
there is no clear indicator that one exists. On the other hand, a clear violation of company policy 
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has occurred, indicating the presence of a control exception. Since the control deficiency 
likelihood assessment measures a more direct link between the inspection report and the seeded 
errors in the workpapers, I use this measure to test H2.  
4.2.2 H2 – Mediation Analysis  
For H2, I predict that group identification mediates the effect of selection basis and group 
affiliation on receptiveness to inspection feedback. I hypothesize that auditors perceive an 
inspection performed on a random basis for a less closely affiliated office as less of a threat to 
the inspected auditors than an inspection performed on a risk basis or on their more closely 
affiliated office, causing them to identify less with the inspected auditors. Theory predicts that 
this weaker identification prevents the trigger of defensive attributions, allowing for effective 
incorporation of the issues mentioned in the report in their work, as evidenced by their audit 
judgments. I test for mediation using the bootstrap approach advocated by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004, 2008). The tested model is shown in Figure 3.  
Since I predict that auditors will most effectively incorporate the feedback in the 
Random/Other Office condition and lowest in the other three conditions, I code the indicator for 
Random/Other Office to be equal to one and zero for the other three conditions.
8
 I find that the 
indirect effect of reading a random-based inspection report for a less closely affiliated group on 
effective incorporation of the inspection feedback, through its effect on identification with the 
inspected auditors, is significantly positive (a*b = 1.65). I test this by constructing a one-tailed 
bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (using 1,000 bootstrapped resamples with 
replacement) and verifying that it does not contain zero [0.13, 5.17]. Directionally, I find that 
being in the Random/Other Office condition reduces identification relative to the other three 
                                                 
8
 Results are identical if I code the conditions using the planned contrast relationship of +¾ for Random/Other 
condition and -¼ for all other conditions.     
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conditions (a = -0.48, p = 0.056, one-tailed)
9
 and that identification with the inspected auditors is 
negatively associated with the effective use of inspection feedback (b = -3.44, p = 0.025, one-
tailed). This is consistent with the theory that stronger identification reduces effective use of 
feedback. These results support H2 that the joint effect of selection basis and group affiliation on 
receptiveness to inspection feedback is mediated through identification with the inspected 
auditors. 
  
                                                 
9
 I also examine the effect of selection basis and group affiliation on identification with inspected auditors using 
ANOVA (See Table 9). I find a marginal main effect of selection basis on identification such that identification is 
higher when the inspection is risk-based (F1,90 = 3.73, p = 0.06). I used a planned contrast to test whether 
identification is lowest in the Random/Other Office condition. Results marginally support this pattern (F1,90 = 2.31, p 
= 0.07, one-tailed) and a semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the main and 
interactive effects of selection basis and group affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not significant 
(F2,90 = 1.52; p = 0.224).  
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5. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
5.1 FURTHER TESTS OF THEORY – ATTRIBUTIONS AND REPORT VALUE 
 I theorize that auditors’ level of identification with the inspected auditors matters because 
it affects how they attribute the negative feedback the inspected auditors receive. Using group-
serving attribution bias, I predict that stronger identification with the inspected group will lead 
the non-inspected auditors to attribute the negative feedback more to external, unstable, and 
specific causes and less to internal, stable, and global causes. I measure four attributions in the 
post-experiment questionnaire: auditor ability, auditor effort, client risk, and bad luck (see Table 
10, Panel A for descriptive statistics and a description of these variables) and regress them 
individually on auditors’ measured identification with the inspected auditors. Consistent with my 
predictions, I find that stronger identification is negatively associated marginally with 
attributions to ability, an internal and stable cause (t94 = -1.54, p = 0.06, one-tailed), and 
significantly with attributions to effort, an internal but unstable cause (t94 = -2.28, p = 0.01, one-
tailed). I also find that stronger identification is positively marginally associated with attributions 
to client risk, an external and relatively unstable cause (t93 = 1.52, p = 0.07, one-tailed). 
However, I do not find any evidence of an association between identification strength and 
attributions to bad luck (p = 0.323).  
I also examine the relationship of auditors’ attributions with report value and audit 
judgments. I measure participants’ report value by their agreement that an IQR “reveals a lot 
about the quality of the work performed by the auditor under review,” indicating they believe 
IQRs capture relevant information about auditor performance (see Table 10, Panel D for 
descriptive statistics of Quality of Work). I find evidence that attributions to ability are 
significantly positively associated with report value (t97 = 4.69, p < 0.001) and audit judgments 
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(t96 = 2.59, p = 0.01), suggesting that auditors who are more willing to attribute inspection 
findings to internal, stable causes also value the report more and incorporate inspection feedback 
into their audit judgments more effectively. I also find a significant association between 
attributions to effort and report value (t97 = 2.94, p = 0.004), but no relationship between 
attributions to effort and audit judgments. No significant associations were found between the 
measured external attributions and report value or audit judgments. Consistent with theory, 
higher assessed report value is significantly positively associated with audit judgments (t96 = 
3.24, p = 0.002).    
5.2 PARTICIPANT EFFORT 
 As a further refinement of theory, I also examine whether auditors in the Random/Other 
Office condition perform better because they work harder or if their effective use of inspection 
feedback is also efficient. I examine participant effort by analyzing the number of review 
comments they provide and the overall word count of their comments (See Table 5, Panel G for 
descriptive statistics). Using ANOVA, I find no significant main or interactive effects of 
Selection Basis and Group Affiliation on the number of comments or word count (all p > 0.24). 
This provides support that the manipulated variables improve the auditors’ effective use of the 





In this study, I investigate how two key features of audit inspection reports – how 
engagements are selected for inspection and who is inspected - affect how auditors respond to 
inspection feedback in their future audits. Specifically, I examine whether reading inspection 
feedback for audits selected on a random basis for a less closely affiliated group can alleviate the 
stronger identification auditors experience with the inspected auditors when the inspections are 
risk-based or cover more closely affiliated auditors. This is important because stronger 
identification can lead auditors to make defensive attributions and consequently use inspection 
feedback less effectively. Using an experiment with professional auditors, I find support for this 
theory, showing that participants who read a random-based inspection report are more likely to 
apply the inspection feedback to their own future work, provided that the report is for a less 
closely affiliated group (e.g., auditors from a different office).  
This finding has important implications for auditors and regulators. On a practical level, 
my theory suggests that auditors would benefit from reading inspection reports, not only for their 
own office, but also for other peer groups. This helps abate auditors’ tendency to feel threatened 
by the inspection, decreasing identification with the auditors, and allowing for increased 
receptiveness to the findings. However, one potential limitation is that inspection feedback for a 
less closely affiliated group may not be relevant to the auditor who reads the report. We know 
from prior literature on PCAOB inspections (e.g., Church and Shefchik 2010; DeFond and 
Lennox 2017) that findings differ along certain distinctions, such as Big 4 firms, annually-
inspected firms, and triennially-inspected firms. It is also likely that differences in findings exist 
between offices within an audit firm, especially by size (Francis and Yu 2009). Therefore, 
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auditors may benefit from reading other reports, provided that those reports are for similarly-
sized offices.  
The theory and findings from this study also support the current efforts by the PCAOB to 
incorporate more random sampling in their inspection selection process (PCAOB 2016, 2017). 
To the extent that this change helps prevent auditors from feeling that their profession is under 
attack, my theory predicts that this new policy should improve auditor incorporation of the 
inspection feedback. My experiment cannot fully speak to this setting because the PCAOB is 
using a mix of risk-based and random selection while the selection basis in my study is fully 
random. However, when Selection Basis is thought of as a continuum from random to systematic 
testing, my theory would predict that moving toward random inspections represents a shift away 
from a selection basis viewed as targeting auditors and should improve receptiveness to 
feedback, provided that auditors also read reports for other audit firms.  
In addition to offering a practical means of improving auditor receptiveness to inspection 
feedback, my study also makes important contributions to the literature on social identity theory 
and group-level attributional bias. I demonstrate that a key institutional feature in performance 
evaluation – the selection basis – has a significant effect on how individuals view the intent of 
that evaluation. In particular, I find that a risk-based selection basis, where evaluators only select 
engagements for inspection where they expect errors to occur, is interpreted as a threat to the 
group being evaluated, increasing one’s identification with that group. This study is the first, to 
my knowledge, to demonstrate this relationship. Additionally, my study is the first, to my 
knowledge, to show that group-level attributions can occur even when the individual did not 
contribute to the group’s outcome. This is particularly important in the audit setting where prior 
year outcomes are a critical input to current year audits.     
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One key group of individuals not addressed in my experiment that future research can 
examine is auditors who have been inspected in the prior year. Both internal and external 
inspections are significant events in an auditor’s career. Partners from large public accounting 
firms believe these inspections can affect their professional reputation and compensation 
(Houston and Stefaniak 2013) and the PCAOB director of inspections recently acknowledged 
that auditors often say they fear an inspection (PCAOB 2015). These factors make it likely that 
the effect of self-serving attributional bias on future performance is somewhat weakened for an 
inspected individual. This is consistent with the self-serving attribution bias literature, which 
finds that reasonable constraints do exist on an individual’s ability to make external attributions. 
For example, Tetlock (1985) finds that accountability, defined as the pressure to justify one’s 
attributions, can reduce or eliminate attribution errors. Therefore, it is reasonable that the 
presence of pecuniary penalties would act as a constraint on auditors making external attributions 
and facilitate their ability to respond to inspector feedback. Due to these institutional features, 
my study focuses on the receptiveness of the much larger population – those who were not 
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Figure 2: Actual Effective Use of Inspection Feedback (H1) 
Panel A: Identification of Control Issue  
  
Panel B: Assessment of Control Deficiency Severity  
 
Panel A presents results for participant identification of the seeded control issue in their review comments. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable coded as one if the participant identified the issue and zero otherwise. I 
manipulate Group Affiliation by stating in the inspection report that auditors from either Home Office or Other 
Office were inspected. I manipulate Selection Basis by informing participants in the inspection report that the 
inspection was performed either on a risk-weighted or random basis. 
Panel B presents results for participant assessments of the severity of the control deficiency related to the audited 
accounting estimate. Participants were asked, “Based on the information you have reviewed, indicate your 
assessment of Cool Beans’ internal controls over financial reporting for the IBNR reserve.” The unnumbered scale 
had 100 tick marks with “No Control Deficiencies Likely” at zero, “Control Deficiency Likely” at 33, “Significant 
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Figure 3: Hypothesized Mediation Model (H2) 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 3 presents the mediation model hypothesized in H2. I follow the Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) approach 
to test for the significance of the indirect effect of the interaction of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation. The 
confidence interval for the indirect effect is a one-tailed 95% bias-corrected interval of the estimate for the indirect 
effect. The indirect effect is significant when the interval does not contain zero. I estimate the confidence interval 
using 1,000 bootstrapped resamples of the data with replacement.  
 
Within Selection Basis, Random was coded as 1 and Risk-Based as 0. Within Group Affiliation, Other Office was 
coded as 1 and Home Office was coded as 0. Therefore, the interaction of the two variables codes Random/Other 
Office as 1 and the three remaining conditions as 0. I manipulate Group Affiliation by stating in the inspection report 
that auditors from either Home Office or Other Office were inspected. I manipulate Selection Basis by informing 
participants in the inspection report that the inspection was performed either on a risk-weighted or random basis.  
 
I measure participants’ Identification with Inspected Auditors using the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale, 
which shows participants 7 sets of two circles that overlap to varying degrees (no overlap to nearly complete 
overlap). One circle says “Self” and the other says “Reviewed Auditors.” The participants are asked to choose which 
set of circles best describe how their “personal attributes, qualities, and values align or overlap with the attributes, 
qualities, and values of the auditors” who were reviewed in the inspection report.     
 
I measure Effective Use of Inspection Feedback as auditor assessments of the severity of the control deficiency for 
the accounting estimate in the audit case. See Figure 2, Panel B for a description of this measure.  
 
All p-values and confidence intervals are one-tailed to reflect directional predictions. Only the direct effect in link c’ 

















Estimate   
Random Other 24 22.3 5.5 1.1 
 
    
(12.3) (7.4) (2.5) 
 
        
  
Home 22 29.3 6.2 1.6 
 
    
(18.4) (9.0) (6.5) 
 
        Risk-weighted Other 25 28.5 7.6 2.8 
 
    
(17.5) (8.2) (7.1) 
 
        
  
Home 30 21.6 6.4 2.6 
     
  
(12.6) (8.0) (6.5)   
        
 Total 101 25.0 6.4 2.1  
    (15.3) (8.0) (5.4)  
 
Table 1 provides self-reported descriptive statistics for the number of months participants have worked in assurance 
(Months in Assurance), the number of times they have prepared an audit working paper for an accounting estimate 
(Prepared Estimate) and the number of times they have reviewed an audit working paper for an accounting estimate 







Manipulation Check Analysis - Pass Rate by Condition 










Correct   
Random Other 23 65% 83% 70% 
 
    
(0.49) (0.39) (0.47) 
 
        
  
Home 22 45% 68% 64% 
 
    
(0.51) (0.48) (0.49) 
 
        Risk-weighted Other 23 39% 70% 52% 
 
    
(0.50) (0.47) (0.51) 
 
        
  
Home 29 38% 52% 72% 
         (0.49) (0.51) (0.45)   
        Panel B: Logistic Regression for Manipulation Check Pass Rate: z-value (p-value) 
Source     





Correct   
Selection Basis 
 
-1.75 -1.03 -1.20 
 
    
(0.08) (0.31) (0.23) 
 Group Affiliation 
 
-1.32 -1.11 -0.42 
 
    
(0.19)  (0.27)  (0.67) 
 Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 0.91 0.04 1.32 
 
 
(0.37) (0.97) (0.19) 
 Residual degrees of freedom   93 93 93   
        Panel C: ANOVA-style tests for Manipulation Check Pass Rate: Wald χ² (p-value) 
Source     





Correct   
Selection Basis 
 
2.71 2.37 0.15 
 
    
(0.10) (0.12) (0.70) 
 Group Affiliation 
 
1.05 2.82 0.50 
 
    
(0.30)  (0.09)  (0.48) 
 Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 0.82 0.00 1.75 
 
 
(0.36) (0.97) (0.19) 
 Residual degrees of freedom   93 93 93   
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Panel D: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests: Wald χ²  (p-value) 
Source     





Correct   
Overall test     
   Model contrast: Random/Other: 3; All other 
conditions: -1  
4.03 2.78 0.32 
 
 
  (0.02*) (0.05*)   (0.29*) 
 Follow-up simple effects 
     Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 
 
0.29 1.38 0.45 
 
 
(0.59) (0.24) (0.50) 
 Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 
 
3.06 1.05 1.44 
 
 
  (0.04*)   (0.15*)   (0.11*) 
 Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 
 
0.01 1.67 2.22 
 
 
(0.93) (0.20) (0.14) 
 Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 
 
1.75 1.24 0.18 
     (0.09*)   (0.13*)   (0.34*)   
 
Panel E: Logistic Regression for Manipulation Response: z-value (p-value) 
Source     
  








  2.87 
    
  (0.004) 
 
Table 2 presents results for participant accuracy when answering the manipulation check question(s) by condition. 
The dependent variable in the column labelled “Both Correct” is coded as one if the participant answered both 
manipulation check questions correctly and zero if they missed at least one check. The dependent variable in the 
column labelled “Basis Correct” is coded as one if the participant answered the Selection Basis manipulation check 
question correctly and zero if they answered incorrectly. The dependent variable in the column labelled “Office 
Correct” is coded as one if the participant answered the Group Affiliation manipulation check question correctly and 
zero if they answered incorrectly. Four participants (one from Random/Other, two from Risk/Other, and one from 
Risk/Home) did not answer the manipulation check questions and are excluded from this analysis.  
 
See Figure 2, Panel A for variable definitions.  
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for manipulation check accuracy rates (% correct of those who answered the 
question) by condition.     
 
Panel B presents results for logistic regressions for each dependent variable.  
 
Panel C presents results for an ANOVA-style test (i.e., test for a contrast pattern of +1, -1, -1, +1) using the 





Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Panel D presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. The theory used to develop H1 
predicts that auditors most effectively incorporate inspection feedback in a random inspection regime when the 
inspected auditors are weakly affiliated with them, implying that they process the information more deeply in that 
condition. Therefore, participants should recall their condition more accurately in the Random/Other Office 
condition than the other three conditions. I test for this by weighting Random/Other Office as +3 and all the other 
conditions as -1. An approximation of a semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the 
main and interactive effects of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not 
significant for Both Correct (F2,93 = 0.22; p = 0.81), Basis Correct (F2,93 = 1.37; p = 0.26), or Office Correct (F2,93 = 
1.10; p = 0.34). The contrast variance residual indicates that only 7% of the between-cells variance is not explained 
by the tested contrast for Both Correct, but the unexplained portion is much higher for Basis Correct (q
2
 = 0.41) and 
Office Correct (q
2
 = 0.86).  
 
Panel E presents the results of logistic regressions testing whether the participants assigned condition for Selection 
Basis (Group Affiliation) had an effect on their response to the Basis (Office) Check questions. The independent and 
dependent variables are coded identically such that a positive z-value indicates that the participants answered the 
check questions correctly on average.   
 





Manipulation Check Analysis - Error Identification 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Error Identification: mean (standard deviation) 
   
Inspected Office 


















   
n = 15 
 
n = 10 
 
n = 25 













   
n = 9 
 
n = 11 
 
n = 20 
        












      n = 24   n = 21   n = 45 
        Panel B: Logistic Regression for Control Error Identification 
Source       Coef Std Err z p-value 
Selection Basis -1.12 0.954 -1.17 0.24 
Group Affiliation -2.06 1.174 -1.76 0.08 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 2.76 1.554 1.77 0.08 
Constant -0.13 0.518 -0.26 0.80 
        Panel C: ANOVA-style follow-up tests for Control Error Identification  
Source       df Wald Chi-Square p-value 
Selection Basis 1 0.11 0.74 
Group Affiliation 1 0.78 0.38 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 3.15 0.08 
        Panel D: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df Wald χ² p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 2.86 0.05* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 1.78 0.18 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 1.38 0.12* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 0.46 0.50 





Table 3 (cont.) 
Panel E: Logistic Regression for Control Error Identification: z-value (p-value) 
Source       Coef Std Err z p-value 
Selection Basis -0.89 0.623 -1.42 0.16 
Group Affiliation -1.29 0.661 -1.96 0.05 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 0.97 0.912 1.07 0.29 
Manipulation Check Performance 0.10 0.321 0.30 0.77 
Constant -0.06 0.643 -0.09 0.93 
        Panel F: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests: Wald χ²  (p-value) 
Source         df Wald χ² p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 5.03 0.01* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.02 0.90 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 2.02 0.08* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 0.26 0.61 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 3.83 0.03* 
 
Table 3 presents results for participant identification of the seeded control issue in their review comments depending 
on whether the participant accurately answered the manipulation check questions. See Figure 2, Panel A for variable 
definitions.  
 
For Panels A-D: results only include participants who answered both manipulation check questions correctly  
 
Panels E and F display results for tests where the participants’ manipulation check performance was included as a 
factor variable in the model. Manipulation Check Performance is a count variable measuring how many 
manipulation check questions the participants answered correctly (0, 1, or 2).  
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participant identification of the seeded control issue for participants who 
answered both manipulation check questions accurately.     
 
Panel B presents results for logistic regressions depending on manipulation check accuracy and Panel C presents 
results for an ANOVA-style test (i.e., test for a contrast pattern of +1, -1, -1, +1) using the previously fitted logistic 
regression model.   
 
Panel D presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. See Table 2 for coding 
information. An approximation of a semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the main 
and interactive effects of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not 
significant (F2,41 = 0.81; p = 0.45). However, the contrast variance residual indicates that 45% of the between-cells 
variance is not explained by the tested contrast.  
 
Panel E presents results of logistic regression where manipulation check performance was included as a factor 
variable and Panel F presents the results of the follow-up planned contrast and simple effects tests.  
 





Manipulation Check Analysis - Audit Judgment 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Assessment: mean (standard deviation) 
   
Inspected Office 


















   
n = 15 
 
n = 10 
 
n = 25 













   
n = 9 
 
n = 11 
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      n = 24   n = 21   n = 45 
        Panel B: Analysis of variance for Control Assessment 
Source       df SS F p-value 
Selection Basis 1 487.03 1.11 0.29 
Group Affiliation 1     2,815.02  6.43 0.01 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 641.57 1.46 0.23 
Residual 41   41,170.08      
        Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df F p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 1.25 0.13* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.04 0.85 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 0.02 0.44* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 2.16 0.15 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 1.62 0.11* 
        Panel D: Analysis of variance for Control Assessment 
Source       df SS F p-value 
Selection Basis 1 503.07 1.17 0.28 
Group Affiliation 1     2,532.12  5.88 0.02 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 659.40 1.53 0.22 
Manipulation Check Performance 2 195.61 0.23 0.79 
Residual 89   38,352.80      
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Panel E: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df F p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 7.18 0.004* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.01 0.92 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 2.59 0.06* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 0.77 0.38 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 6.22 0.007* 
 
Table 4 presents results for participant assessments of the severity of the control deficiency related to the audited 
accounting estimate depending on whether the participant accurately answered the manipulation check question(s). 
See Figure 2, Panel B for variable definitions.  
 
For Panels A-C: results only include participants who answered both manipulation check questions correctly  
 
Panels D and E display results for tests where the participants’ manipulation check performance was included as a 
factor variable in the model. Manipulation Check Performance is a count variable measuring how many 
manipulation check questions the participants answered correctly (0, 1, or 2).  
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participant assessments of the severity of the control deficiency related to 
the audited accounting estimate depending on manipulation check accuracy.     
 
Panel B presents results from traditional ANOVA tests depending on manipulation check accuracy and Panel C 
presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. See Table 2 for coding information.  
 
Panel D presents results from traditional ANOVA tests where manipulation check performance was included as a 
factor variable and Panel E presents the results of the follow-up planned contrast and simple effects tests.  
 





Review Performance & Effort 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Overall Error Identification: mean (standard deviation) 
Selection Basis Inspected Office Count of Errors Early Errors Late Errors   
Random Other 
 
1.29 0.38 0.71 
 
    
(1.08) (0.49) (0.46) 
 




0.95 0.45 0.36 
 
    
(0.95) (0.51) (0.49) 
 
        Risk-weighted Other 
 
1.00 0.56 0.40 
 
    
(0.71) (0.51) (0.50) 
 




1.00 0.47 0.47 
 
    
(0.83) (0.51) (0.51) 
 




1.05 0.47 0.49 
         (0.89) (0.50) (0.50)   
        Panel B: Regression for Overall Error Identification: z-value (p-value) 
Source     Count of Errors Early Errors Late Errors   
Selection Basis 
 
-1.17 1.29 -2.13 
 
    
(0.24) (0.20) (0.03) 
 Group Affiliation 
 
-1.13 0.55 -2.29 
 
    
(0.26)  (0.59)  (0.02) 
 Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 0.90 -0.87 2.06 
  (0.37) (0.39) (0.04) 
 Residual degrees of freedom   97 97 97   
        Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests: Wald χ²  (p-value) 
Source     Count of Errors Early Errors Late Errors   
Overall test     
   Model contrast: Random/Other: 3;  
All other conditions: -1 
1.95 1.02 6.12 
 (0.08*) (0.31) (0.007*) 
 Follow-up simple effects 
     Effect of selection basis given Home 
Office inspected 
0.03 0.01 0.55 
 (0.86) (0.93) (0.46) 
 Effect of selection basis given Other 
Office inspected 
1.37 1.66 4.54 
 (0.12*) (0.20) (0.02*) 
 Effect of group affiliation given Risk-
based inspection 
0.00 0.47 0.25 
 (1.00) (0.49) (0.62) 
 Effect of group affiliation given Random 
inspection 
1.28 0.3 5.26 
 (0.13*) (0.58) (0.01*)   
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Table 5 (cont.) 














0.13 0.29 0.38 0.50 
    
(0.34) (0.46) (0.46) (0.51) 




0.14 0.36 0.23 0.23 
    
(0.35) (0.49) (0.43) (0.43) 
        Risk-weighted Other 
 
0.20 0.40 0.12 0.28 
    
(0.41) (0.50) (0.33) (0.46) 




0.13 0.37 0.27 0.23 
    
(0.35) (0.49) (0.45) (0.43) 




0.15 0.36 0.25 0.31 
        (0.36) (0.48) (0.43) (0.46) 
        Panel E: Regression for Individual Error Identification: z-value (p-value) 
Source     










0.70 0.79 -1.99 -1.56 
    
(0.48) (0.43) (0.05) (0.12) 
Group Affiliation 
 
0.11 0.52 -1.08 -1.88 
    
(0.91)  (0.60)  (0.28) (0.06) 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation -0.51 -0.56 1.71 1.09 
    (0.61) (0.58) (0.09) (0.28) 
Residual degrees of freedom   97 97 97 97 
        Panel F: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests: Wald χ²  (p-value) 










Overall test     
   Model contrast: Random/Other: 3;  
All other conditions: -1 
0.12 0.57 3.02 5.26 
(0.36*) (0.23*) (0.04*) (0.01*) 
Follow-up simple effects 
     Effect of selection basis given Home Office 
inspected 
0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
(0.97) (0.98) (0.75) (0.96) 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office 
inspected 
0.50 0.63 3.94 2.44 
(0.24*) (0.21*) (0.02*) (0.06*) 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based 
inspection 
0.44 0.06 1.75 0.16 
(0.51) (0.80) (0.19) (0.69) 
Effect of group affiliation given Random 
inspection 
0.01 0.27 1.16 3.52 
(0.45*) (0.30*) (0.14*) (0.03*) 
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        Table 5 (cont.) 






Count   
Number of 











































         (49.3)   (1.9)   
 
Table 5 presents results for participant review performance (Panels A-F) and effort (Panel G). The label for each 
column indicates the dependent variable. For Panels A-C, Count of Errors is a count variable that captures how 
many of the four seeded errors the participant identified in their review comments, Early (Late) Errors is a binary 
variable coded as one if the participant found at least one of the first (last) two errors included in the inspection 
report and zero otherwise. For Panels D-F, Calculation Error, Rate Assumption, Complete & Accurate, and Control 
Deficiency are binary variables coded as one if the participant identified the respective seeded error in their review 
comments and zero otherwise. In Panel G, Word Count is a count of the number of words the participant wrote in 
their review comments. Number of Comments is a count of the number of review comments the participants wrote. 
See Figure 2 for independent variable definitions.  
 
Panels A and D provides descriptive statistics for the count or rates of identification of the seeded errors.  
 
Panels B and E provide logistic (Poisson) regression results for the binary measures (Count of Errors) and Panels C 
and F present results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects using the previously fitted 
regression model. See Table 2 for coding information.  
 
Panel G provides descriptive statistics for review effort variables 
 






Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Error Identification: mean (standard deviation) 
   
Inspected Office 


















   
n = 24 
 
n = 22 
 
n = 46 













   
n = 25 
 
n = 30 
 
n = 55 
        












      n = 49   n = 52   n = 101 
        Panel B: Logistic Regression for Control Error Identification 
Source       Coef Std Err z p-value 
Selection Basis -9.44 0.604 -1.56 0.12 
Group Affiliation -1.22 0.652 -1.88 0.06 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 0.98 0.900 1.09 0.28 
Constant 0.00 0.408 0.00 1.00 
        Panel C: ANOVA-style follow-up tests for Control Error Identification  
Source       df Wald Chi-Square p-value 
Selection Basis 1 1.02 0.31 
Group Affiliation 1 2.66 0.10 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 1.18 0.28 
        Panel D: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df Wald χ² p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 5.26   0.01* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.00 0.96 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 2.44   0.06* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 0.16 0.69 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 3.52   0.03* 
 
Table 6 presents results for participant identification of the seeded control issue in their review comments. The 
author and an independent coder (both blind to conditions) categorized all review comments according to the issues 
identified in the comment. The seeded control issue involved the improper preparation of an accounting estimate 




Table 6 (cont.) 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participant identification of the seeded control issue. The dependent 
variable was coded as one if the participant identified the issue in their review comments and as zero otherwise. 
Therefore, the means represent the percentage of participants in each condition who identified the seeded issue.     
 
Panel B presents results for a logistic regression. I manipulate Selection Basis by informing participants in the 
inspection report that the inspection was performed either on a risk-weighted or random basis. I manipulate Group 
Affiliation by stating in the inspection report that auditors from either Home Office or Other Office were inspected.  
 
Panel C presents results for an ANOVA-style test (i.e., test for a contrast pattern of +1, -1, -1, +1) using the 
previously fitted logistic regression model.   
 
Panel D presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. In H1, I predict that auditors 
most effectively incorporate inspection feedback in a random inspection regime when the inspected auditors are 
weakly affiliated with them. Operationally, I predict that auditors in the Random/Other Office condition (weighted 
+3) will identify the control issue significantly more than auditors in the other three conditions (each weighted -1). 
In line with this prediction, I expect that the simple effect of Selection Basis will be significant when the Other 
Office is inspected and that the simple effect of Group Affiliation will be significant when the selection basis is 
random. An approximation of a semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the main and 
interactive effects of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not significant 
(F2,97 = 0.11; p = 0.89) and the contrast variance residual indicates that only 3% of the between-cells variance is not 
explained by the tested contrast.  
 





Audit Judgment – Control Deficiency Assessment 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Assessment of Control Deficiency: mean (standard deviation) 
   
Group Affiliation 
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      n = 48   n = 50   n = 98 
        Panel B: Analysis of variance for Assessment of Control Deficiency 
Source       df SS F p-value 
Selection Basis 1 487.03 1.11 0.29 
Group Affiliation 1 2,815.02 6.43 0.01 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 641.57 1.46 0.23 
Residual 94 41,170.08     
        Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df F p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 7.43    0.004* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.01 0.91 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 2.54   0.06* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 0.98 0.33 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 6.37     0.001* 
  
Table 7 presents results for participant assessments of the severity of the control deficiency related to the audited 
accounting estimate. After participants reviewed the workpaper, they were asked, “Based on the information you 
have reviewed, indicate your assessment of Cool Beans’ internal controls over financial reporting for the IBNR 
reserve.” The scale had 100 tick marks, but was not numbered. The scale was anchored on the left by “No Control 
Deficiencies Likely” at zero and “Material Weakness Likely” on the right at 100. “Control Deficiency Likely” fell 
on the scale at 33 and “Significant Deficiency Likely” was at 67. Therefore, the scale captures assessments of both 
the likelihood and assessed severity of control issues.   
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participant assessments of control deficiency severity.     
Panel B presents results for a traditional ANOVA test. I manipulate Selection Basis by informing participants in the 
inspection report that the inspection was performed either on a Risk-weighted or Random basis. I manipulate Group 
Affiliation by stating in the inspection report that auditors from either Home Office or Other Office were inspected.  
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Table 7 (cont.) 
 
Panel C presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. In H1, I predict that auditors 
most effectively incorporate inspection feedback in a random inspection regime when the inspected auditors are 
weakly affiliated with them. Operationally, I predict that auditors in the Random/Other Office condition (weighted 
+3) will identify the control issue significantly more than auditors in the other three conditions (each weighted -1). 
In line with this prediction, I expect that the simple effect of Selection Basis will be significant when the Other 
Office is inspected and that the simple effect of Group Affiliation will be significant when the selection basis is 
random. A semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the main and interactive effects of 
Selection Basis and Group Affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not significant (F2,94 = 0.67; p = 
0.52) and the contrast variance residual indicates that only 15% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the 
tested contrast.  
 





Audit Judgment - Likelihood of Misstatement 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Misstatement Assessment: mean (standard deviation) 
   
Inspected Office 
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      n = 48   n = 50   n = 98 
        Panel B: Analysis of variance for Misstatement Assessment 
Source       df SS F p-value 
Selection Basis 1 66.86 1.11 0.29 
Group Affiliation 1     2,667.30  6.43 0.01 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 214.06 1.46 0.23 
Residual 94   43,424.83      
        Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df F p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 2.36 0.06* 
Random/Other Office: 3; All other conditions: -1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 0.57 0.45 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 0.04 0.42* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 1.65 0.20 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 4.32 0.02* 
 
Table 8 presents results for participant assessments of the likelihood that a misstatement exists at the fictitious client. 
Participants were asked, “Based on the information you have reviewed, what do you think the likelihood is that Cool 
Beans’ IBNR reserve is materially misstated?” and provided responses from 0 (Extremely Unlikely) to 100 
(Exremely Likely).  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participant assessments of the likelihood the audited accounting estimate is 
materially misstated     
 





Table 8 (cont.) 
 
Panel C presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. See Table 2 for coding. A semi-
omnibus test confirms that the residual variance attributable to the main and interactive effects of Selection Basis 
and Group Affiliation after accounting for the planned contrast is not significant (F2,94 = 1.84; p = 0.17). However, 
the contrast variance residual indicates that 62% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the tested contrast 






Identification with Inspected Auditors 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Identification with Inspected Auditors: mean (standard deviation) 
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      n = 46   n = 48   n = 94 
        Panel B: Analysis of variance for Identification with Inspected Auditors 
Source       df SS F p-value 
Selection Basis 1 5.61 3.73 0.06 
Group Affiliation 1 1.83 1.22 0.27 
Selection Basis x Group Affiliation 1 0.23 0.15 0.70 
Residual 90     135.37     
        Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source         df F p-value 
Overall test 
   Model contrast:  1 2.31   0.07* 
Random/Other Office: -3; All other conditions: +1 
   Follow-up simple effects 
   Effect of selection basis given Home Office inspected 1 2.73 0.10 
Effect of selection basis given Other Office inspected 1 1.17   0.14* 
Effect of group affiliation given Risk-based inspection 1 1.16 0.28 
Effect of group affiliation given Random inspection 1 0.25   0.31* 
 
Table 9 presents results for participant responses to a post-experiment question measuring the strength of their 
identification with the inspected auditors. I measure participants’ Identification with Inspected Auditors using the 
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale, which shows participants 7 sets of two circles that overlap to varying 
degrees (no overlap to nearly complete overlap). One circle says “Self” and the other says “Reviewed Auditors.” 
The participants are asked to choose which set of circles best describe how their “personal attributes, qualities, and 
values align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of the auditors” who were reviewed in the inspection 
report. A score of 1 indicates no overlap and 7 indicates nearly complete overlap.     
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for participants’ indicated strength of identification with the inspected 






Table 9 (cont.) 
 
Panel B presents results for a traditional ANOVA test. I manipulate Selection Basis by informing participants in the 
inspection report that the inspection was performed either on a Risk-weighted or Random basis. I manipulate Group 
Affiliation by stating in the inspection report that auditors from either Home Office or Other Office were inspected.  
 
Panel C presents results from planned contrast testing and follow-up simple effects. In H2, I hypothesize that the 
predicted pattern in H1 is mediated by the strength of the auditors’ identification with the inspected auditors. This 
implies that auditors in the Random/Other Office condition should identify with the inspected auditors the least 
(weighted -3) in comparison to the other three conditions (each weighted +1). In line with this pattern, the simple 
effect of Selection Basis should be significant when the Other Office is inspected and that the simple effect of Group 
Affiliation should be significant when the selection basis is random. A semi-omnibus test confirms that the residual 
variance attributable to the main and interactive effects of Selection Basis and Group Affiliation after accounting for 
the planned contrast is not significant (F2,90 = 1.52; p = 0.22). However, the contrast variance residual indicates that 
54% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the tested contrast.  
 










Post-Experiment Questionnaire Responses 






Ability Luck Client Effort 
Random Other 
 
50.8 14.1 44.7 51.4 
    
(26.7) (15.9) (25.0) (30.2) 




47.8 15.4 41.7 65.1 
    
(17.7) (17.5) (27.2) (18.3) 
        Risk-weighted Other 
 
53.5 20.2 56.1 49.8 
    
(25.8) (23.7) (25.6) (25.4) 




49.1 17.1 39.1 50.0 
        (19.4) (17.0) (26.6) (29.3) 







Home Ideal Office Commit Duration 
Random Other 
 
3.7 62.1 55.8 54.6 
    
(1.5) (25.1) (21.4) (21.6) 




4.5 59.3 55.8 53.3 
    
(1.7) (21.2) (20.8) (19.8) 
        Risk-weighted Other 
 
4.0 57.2 62.3 53.2 
    
(1.2) (23.8) (16.5) (23.3) 




4.4 62.3 57.6 51.3 
        (1.5) (24.0) (21.4) (24.8) 
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Table 10 (cont.) 














Random Other 77 32.3 80.1 43.0 69.7 
   
(20.4) (27.8) (16.8) (24.1) (19.8) 
        
  
Home 62 37.0 77.1 47.4 60.9 
   
(21.3) (23.4) (20.3) (28.7) (18.0) 
        Risk-weighted Other 77.21 38.5 82.5 39.5 64.2 
   
(16.8) (26.5) (16.0) (27.6) (13.2) 
        
  
Home 74.6 30.5 77.5 41.9 62.6 
      (17.5) (24.0) (12.8) (27.9) (16.2) 




  Risk of 
Failure   
Quality of 











































         (19.1)   (23.3)   
 
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for post-experiment questionnaire responses. Unless otherwise indicated, 
participants indicated their level of agreement on a scale of 0 (Strongly Disagree) to 100 (Strongly Agree) 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for questions relating to attributions of the deficiencies in the internal quality 
review memo. The variables indicate agreement that “The auditors received audit deficiencies due to…” “their 
ability as an auditor” (Ability), “bad luck” (Luck), “the riskiness of their client” (Client), or “lack of effort” (Effort). 
 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics questions relating to the participants’ identification with the auditors in the 
case and in their actual firms. Identify Home measures the participants identification with the auditors in Home 
Office using the same IOS scale used to measure Identification with Inspected Auditors in Table 9. A score of 1 
indicates the lowest degree of identification and 7 indicates the highest. Ideal Office asks their agreement that “The 
real office I work at in my audit firm is identical to what I consider an ideal office.” Commit asks “Relative to others 
of your experience level, how committed would you say you are to your firm?” (0 for “Extremely Less Committed” 
to 100 for “Extremely More Committed”). Duration asks “Relative to others of your experience level, how much 





Table 10 (cont.) 
 
Panel C provides descriptive statistics for questions relating to participants’ views on applying the deficiencies in the 
internal quality review report to their own work. Apply to Avoid asks agreement with the following statement: 
“Applying the issues identified in the internal quality review (IQR) memorandum to my own work would help me 
avoid receiving an IQR audit deficiency more than ignoring the issues.” Apply to be Better asks agreement with: 
“Applying the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum to my own work would not help me 
perform a substantially better audit than ignoring the issues.” Apply b/c Important asks agreement with: “It is 
important to address the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum.” Apply to Comply asks 
agreement with: “Addressing the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum is more about 
complying with reviewers than improving audit quality.” Lastly, Apply b/c Likely asks participants to answer “What 
do you think is the likelihood that the current year Cool Beans engagement will be subject to an internal quality 
review during the next year?” (0 for “Extremely Unlikely” to 100 for “Extremely Likely”).  
 
Panel D provides descriptive statistics for questions relating to participants’ views on the value of the IQR report. 
Risk of Failure measures agreement with: “The audit deficiencies identified in the internal quality review 
memorandum pose an unacceptably high risk of audit failure (i.e. the issuance of an incorrect audit opinion).” 
Quality of Work measures agreement with: “Receiving an audit deficiency in an internal quality review reveals a lot 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
 





Exhibit 2: Working Paper Errors 
 
 
All procedures performed by Jane Smith, Audit Firm associate, unless otherwise noted
5.  Conclude on the appropriateness of 
management's estimate of the IBNR 
reserve
5.  Based on procedures performed in w/p "IBNR 
Reserve Calculation," I conclude that the IBNR 
reserve is appropriately stated in all material respects 
without exception. 
Tailored Procedures Results
1.  Obtain the IBNR reserve calculation 
from the Accounting Manager
1.  Obtained the IBNR reserve calculation from Hank 
Hart, Cool Beans Accounting Manager. See w/p 
"IBNR Reserve Calculation" for the calculation. 
2.  Agree the Q4 claims data used in the 
IBNR reserve calculation to the Monthly 
Claims Processed reprots from AHA
2.  Obtained the Monthly Claims Processed AHA 
reports for October, November, and December from 
H. Hart, Accounting Manager, and agreed the total 
monthly claims amount to the AHA reports without 
exception. See w/p "IBNR Reserve Calculation" for 
work performed. 
Testing Approach: Per AS 2501.10-.13, it is acceptable to test accounting estimates using any 
of the following three approaches: (1) Reviewing and testing management's process used to 
develop the estimate, (2) Developing an independent estimate to corroborate the reasonableness 
of management's estimate, or (3) Reviewing subsequent events or subsequent transactions to 
confirm the estimate. I chose to review and test management's process. See tailored procedures 
below for the specific testing approach. 
Purpose: To test that the year-end IBNR reserve is valued appropriately
3.  Recalculate the reserve as 50% of the 
sum of the Q4 monthly claims processed, 
in accordance with company policy
3.  Recalculated the reserve as 50% of the sum of the 
Q4 monthly claims processed without exception. See 
w/p "IBNR Reserve Calculation" for work 
performed.
4.  Examine evidence of the VP and 
Controller's approval of the journal entry, 
and agree the calculated IBNR reserve to 
the final recorded reserve balance
4.  Examined evidence of the VP and Controller's 
approval of the journal entry for Q4 as part of control 
testing. See w/p "MED-6 JE Review - 1" for work 
performed. No exceptions noted.
Seeded documentation 
error - does not 
indicate that J. Smith 
agreed the final 
balance, but she did in 
the calculation page.
Other error: Should 
consider whether this 
review control is 
working properly after 
reviewing test of 
reserve calculation. 
Seeded error type 2 - 
should obtain the 
reports directly from 
AHA to better ensure 
completeness and 
accuracy.
Seeded documentation error - 
report is spelled "reprot"
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Exhibit 2 (cont.) 
PBC - Hank Hart, Cool Beans Accounting Manager
All tickmarks by J. Smith, Audit Firm Associate, unless otherwise noted
a b RC
Month Claims ('000) Reserve Rate IBNR Reserve
Oct 1,172             
Nov 561                
Dec 793                








Noted that the IBNR Reserve recorded as of year-end was $1,354K. Per inquiry of H. 
Hart, he was sick when the journal entry was processed and the Assisstant Accounting 
Manager, P. Park, calculated the reserve as the sum of the claims in the last two months 
of the quarter instead of 50% of the whole quarter claims. Given that the difference of 
$90K is below our de minimis threshold, we waive this difference as immaterial. 
Sum is accurately calculated without exception
Recalculates as the total claims times 50% without exception
Agreed "Claims" per calculation to the total claims in the AHA Monthly Claims Reports 
for October, November, and December obtained from H. Hart without exception
Agreed the reserve rate to the company policy without exception. 
Seeded error type 3 - sum should be 2,526
Seeded errors type 2 - (1) Reports should be obtained directly from AHA; (2) Auditor 
needs to be comfortable that the claims data sent to AHA is accurate and complete
Seeded error type 1- Need to evaluate if the reserve rate is reasonable, especially 
given that claims do not appear to occur evenly. The reserve may be understated if 
there has been a delay in paying out claims from Nov & Dec. or overstated if 
October was an unusually large month.  
Seeded error type 4 - While the difference is immaterial, this could indicate a control 
deficiency, especially since the JE was approved by the VP & Controller.
Other issues - (1) amount is over $1M and client has stop-loss policy, so it is possible that this 
entire amount is not owed if it relates to one claim; (2) claims are not evenly received, with most 
occurring in the 1st month this quarter. Therefore, reserve may be overstated. 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
Pre-Case Task 
Before beginning the study, please take a few moments to think about your local office (the 
office you are based out of at your audit firm) and respond to the following:  
 







You are an audit senior based out of Home Office at Audit Firm LLP. Presume that Home Office 
is very much like the office you just described on the previous page.  
Your audit firm, Audit Firm LLP, is the auditor for Cool Beans Inc. (“Cool Beans”), which 
roasts and sells coffee beans for distribution to other intermediaries (e.g. catering, food 
distributors, etc.) as well as directly to various retailers. You have been assigned as the audit 
senior for the engagement this year. This is your first time working on Cool Beans, but you have 
worked on other engagements with individuals on the current or past Cool Beans audit teams. All 
Cool Beans audit team members are based out of Home Office, the same Audit Firm LLP office 
where you work.  
In this case study, you will be asked to review some of the working papers prepared by Jane 
Smith, an audit staff, that relates to the audit of an accounting estimate at Cool Beans Inc. 
I understand that the nature and amount of information provided to you in this case may be 
different from what you normally would have on an audit engagement. Please provide your best 
professional judgment using the available information in the case. You may assume that any 
working papers not included in your materials have been properly prepared.  
Instructions for recording your review comments will be provided within the packet. Please 
ensure that your review comments are detailed in terms of describing any problems or issues 
noted in the working papers and the follow-up actions that Jane needs to adopt.    
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Prior to beginning the audit case, please read the following memorandum issued by leadership at 
your firm to all Audit Firm LLP assurance staff members regarding recent internal quality review 
findings at Home (Other) Office (the (a different) office (from) where you work). Note that the 
Cool Beans engagement was not subject to an internal quality review in the prior year nor were 
any of its audit team members.  
 




TO: Assurance Partners, Senior Managers, Managers, Senior Associates, and Associates 
FROM: Audit Firm LLP Leadership Team 
DATE: January 31, 2017 
SUBJECT: Internal Quality Review Findings for Audits Performed at Home (Other) Office in 
2016 
 
 In 2016, the Audit Firm LLP Internal Quality Review team conducted reviews of several 
financial statement audits performed throughout the year at Home (Other) Office. Reviews are 
designed and performed to provide a basis for assessing the degree of compliance by an office 
with applicable regulatory and firm standards. The quality review included inspections of 
portions of selected financial statement audits. These reviews were intended to identify whether 
deficiencies existed in the reviewed work. The purpose of this memorandum is to communicate 
these identified deficiencies to Audit Firm LLP assurance staff members so that appropriate 
actions are taken in future audits to avoid these deficiencies. 
I. Engagement Selection Approach   
[Risk-weighted basis]  
Individual audits and areas of review focus were selected on a risk-weighted basis. Thus, the 
audit work is generally selected for inspection based on factors that heighten the possibility that 
auditing deficiencies are present. 
[Random basis] 
Individual audits and areas of review focus are selected on a random basis. Thus, the audit work 





II. Identified Audit Deficiencies in Risk-Weighted (Random) Sample 
The Internal Quality Review team identified the following deficiencies on engagements at 
Clients A, B, and C, which were chosen for review on a risk-weighted (random) basis. 
Client A 
In this audit, the engagement team failed to perform sufficient procedures related to the 
issuer's deferred tax assets. Specifically – 
o To test the domestic deferred tax asset valuation allowance, the team developed 
an independent expectation of the estimated future tax benefit. The team failed to 
support the appropriateness of the data used and assumptions made in developing 
this expectation. In addition, the team failed to identify that the spreadsheet it 
used contained formula errors that affected the calculated expected tax benefit by 




In this audit, the engagement team's procedures related to the valuation of intangible 
assets acquired during the year in business combinations were insufficient. Specifically – 
o The team failed to sufficiently test the fair value of the acquired technology and 
vendor-relationship intangible assets for certain acquisitions. The team compared 
certain significant inputs and assumptions to financial information from another 
business combination the client consummated during the year. The team 's 
procedures did not include evaluating the reasonableness of these inputs and 
assumptions underlying the valuation of these assets beyond such comparisons. In 
addition, the team failed to test the accuracy and completeness of the data used in 
the valuation of these intangible assets. (AU 328, paragraphs .26, .28, and .39) 
Client C 
In this audit, the engagement team failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to 
support its audit opinions on the financial statements and on the effectiveness of ICFR, as it 
failed to perform sufficient procedures related to inventory. Specifically – 
 The team failed to sufficiently test a control that consisted of reviews of the allowance for 
excess and obsolete inventory. Specifically, the team failed to evaluate how matters were 
selected for follow up and whether those matters were appropriately addressed. (AS No. 
5, paragraphs 39, 42, and 44) 
 
 The team failed to evaluate the reasonableness of the significant assumptions and test the 
accuracy and completeness of the significant data that the issuer used in determining its 






You will now begin the case study. Your task is to prepare review notes for a working paper 
prepared by Jane Smith, Audit Firm associate, relating to the audit of an accounting estimate for 
medical claims at Cool Beans Inc. Please write your review notes in the space provided below. 
To help you perform your review, you have been provided with the following information:  
1. Background information on Cool Beans and the IBNR reserve 
2. Cool Beans accounting policy for the IBNR reserve 
3. Excerpt from your team’s walkthrough of the medical claims process 
Again, please provide your best professional judgment using the available case information. You 
may assume any working papers not included in your materials have been properly prepared. 
Review Notes 
Please use the following space to write any review notes you have for work performed by Jane 
Smith in testing the IBNR reserve calculation. Please ensure your review comments are detailed 
in terms of describing any problems or issues noted in the working papers and the follow-up 





Background Information on Cool Beans and the IBNR Reserve 
Audit Firm LLP has been engaged to conduct the FY 2016 integrated audit for Cool Beans Inc., 
a domestic public entity that roasts and sells coffee beans. 
Cool Beans offers medical benefits to its employees such that all preventative care is reimbursed 
at 100% and other eligible claims are generally reimbursed at 85%. Cool Beans is self-insured 
for employee medical claims, but maintains a liability cap of $1 million per person per incident 
through the use of stop-loss insurance coverage. Cool Beans has never had to use this coverage 
and their business and workforce has remained stable.  
To protect employee privacy, Cool Beans uses a third party, Apollo Health Administrators 
(“AHA”) to process employee medical claims. AHA determines the eligibility of the claims and 
processes the related payments.  
Since there is a lag between the date a medical event occurs and the date the claim is filed with 
AHA, Cool Beans must maintain a reserve for incurred but not yet reported (“IBNR”) medical 
claims. This reserve typically exceeds performance materiality. Due to the inherent uncertainty 
underlying this estimate, your engagement team has assessed the risk that this reserve is over or 
understated to be elevated. There have been no identified material misstatements in this account 
in prior year audits.  
 
Cool Beans Accounting Policy for IBNR Reserve Calculation 
Based on historical lag analyses from Apollo Health Administrators, the estimated lag between 
the occurrence of a medical claim event and the filing of the claim is 45 days. Therefore, the 
IBNR reserve shall be calculated at each quarter-end as 50% (“reserve rate”) of the total claims 
processed in that quarter. The Claims Administrator and Accounting Manager should obtain and 
review any new lag analyses quarterly to assess whether this reserve rate is still appropriate. 
Any adjustments to the IBNR reserve above or below the amount prescribed by the reserve rate 
must be approved by the Controller and VP.   
 
Note: For the purposes of this case, you can assume your team has performed adequate 
controls and substantive testing to address risks associated with the eligibility of employee 




Excerpt from “Walkthrough of Employee Medical Claims Process” 
Note: You may assume that the following documentation has been adequately reviewed by a 
member of your team and all review comments have been appropriately addressed. 
Process Flow – Employee Medical Claims 
1. Employee initiates the medical claims process by submitting a claim to the Claims 
Administrator (“CA”), who enters the claim information (including employee ID and claim 
date) into TrackApp, a claims tracking application. TrackApp assigns the claim a unique 
number to be used for tracking and reconciliation. At the end of each week, the CA generates 
a report from TrackApp and sends it to Apollo Health Administrators (“AHA”). 
2. AHA receives the TrackApp report from the CA and determines the eligibility of each new 
claim. If the claim is eligible, AHA processes the claim and pays the employee directly. If it 
is not eligible, AHA rejects the claim and notifies the employee of its decision. At the end of 
each month, AHA sends a packet to the CA including (1) the “Monthly Claims Report,” 
which lists all processed and rejected claims for the month; (2) a listing of claims exceeding 
the liability cap; (3) an analysis of claims for significant illnesses and injuries; (4) the invoice 
for claims paid by AHA; and (5) a historical lag analysis (from incurrence to payment).  
3. Each month, the CA examines the information provided by AHA for unusual activity and 
reconciles the TrackApp data with the Monthly Claims Report to identify any claims not 
listed as processed or rejected. The CA resolves any discrepancies with AHA. Once the 
reconciliation process is complete, TrackApp automatically generates a monthly journal 
entry in SAP for medical claims processed by AHA.  
4. Each month, the Accounting Manager obtains the Monthly Claims Report and approves the 
AHA invoice for payment. Each quarter, the Accounting Manager and CA meet to review 
any trends in claims over the prior three months. The Accounting Manager calculates the 
IBNR reserve as prescribed by company policy, makes any necessary adjustments, and 
records the adjusting journal entry in SAP.   
5. Each quarter, the Accounting Manager provides the IBNR reserve calculation and supporting 
documentation to the VP and Controller, who review and approve the final IBNR estimate 




(REVIEW THIS WORKPAPER – Please include your review notes on p. 5) 
Substantive Testing – IBNR Reserve  
All procedures performed by Jane Smith, Audit Firm associate, unless otherwise noted 
         Purpose: To test that the year-end IBNR reserve is valued appropriately 
         Testing Approach: Per AS 2501.10-.13, it is acceptable to test accounting estimates using any 
of the following three approaches: (1) Reviewing and testing management's process used to 
develop the estimate, (2) Developing an independent estimate to corroborate the reasonableness 
of management's estimate, or (3) Reviewing subsequent events or subsequent transactions to 
confirm the estimate. I chose to review and test management's process. See tailored procedures 
below for the specific testing approach.  
         Tailored Procedures Results 
1.  Obtain the IBNR reserve calculation 
from the Accounting Manager 
1.  Obtained the IBNR reserve calculation from Hank 
Hart, Cool Beans Accounting Manager. See w/p 
"IBNR Reserve Calculation" for the calculation.  
2.  Agree the Q4 claims data used in the 
IBNR reserve calculation to the Monthly 
Claims Processed reprots from AHA 
2.  Obtained the Monthly Claims Processed AHA 
reports for October, November, and December from 
H. Hart, Accounting Manager, and agreed the total 
monthly claims amount to the AHA reports without 
exception. See w/p "IBNR Reserve Calculation" for 
work performed.  
3.  Recalculate the reserve as 50% of the 
sum of the Q4 monthly claims processed, 
in accordance with company policy 
3.  Recalculated the reserve as 50% of the sum of the 
Q4 monthly claims processed without exception. See 
w/p "IBNR Reserve Calculation" for work 
performed. 
4.  Examine evidence of the VP and 
Controller's approval of the journal entry, 
and agree the calculated IBNR reserve to 
the final recorded reserve balance 
4.  Examined evidence of the VP and Controller's 
approval of the journal entry for Q4 as part of control 
testing. See w/p "MED-6 JE Review - 1" for work 
performed. No exceptions noted. 
5.  Conclude on the appropriateness of 
management's estimate of the IBNR 
reserve 
5.  Based on procedures performed in w/p "IBNR 
Reserve Calculation," I conclude that the IBNR 
reserve is appropriately stated in all material respects 
without exception.  
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Substantive Testing – IBNR Reserve p. 2  
 
IBNR Reserve Calculation 
PBC - Hank Hart, Cool Beans Accounting Manager 
    All tickmarks by J. Smith, Audit Firm Associate, unless otherwise noted 
    
      
 
a b RC 








    Oct              1,172  
      Nov                 561 
      Dec                 793 
      Total              2,528 50%               1,264  c 
   
 
P
      
        Tickmark Legend 
P Sum is accurately calculated without exception 
RC Recalculates as the total claims times 50% without exception 
a Agreed "Claims" per calculation to the total claims in the AHA Monthly Claims 
Reports for October, November, and December obtained from H. Hart without 
exception 
b Agreed the reserve rate to the company policy without exception.  
c Noted that the IBNR Reserve recorded as of year-end was $1,354K. Per inquiry of 
H. Hart, he was sick when the journal entry was processed and the Assistant 
Accounting Manager, P. Park, calculated the reserve as the sum of the claims in the 
last two months of the quarter instead of 50% of the whole quarter claims. Given 
that the difference of $90K is below our de minimis threshold, we waive this 
difference as immaterial.  
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Please indicate your responses to the following questions by placing a vertical line at the 
appropriate point on each scale.  
 
Based on the information you have reviewed, what do you think the likelihood is that Cool 
Beans’ IBNR reserve is materially misstated? 
 
Extremely Unlikely        As Likely As Not         Extremely Likely 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90        100 
 
      
 
Based on the information you have reviewed, indicate your assessment of Cool Beans’ internal 
controls over financial reporting for the IBNR reserve: 




















Please refer back to the Review Notes you completed for Jane Smith on p. 5. In the margin of 
your Review Notes, please rank each note in order of priority for Jane to address. The highest 
priority item should be labelled with a “1” and lower priority items should receive lower 
rankings (e.g. 2, 3, etc.). When you have completed this task, check the box below and continue 
with the instructions at the bottom of this page.  
 



























You have now completed Part 1 of the study.  
Please place this packet back in Envelope 1.  
Remove the contents of Envelope 2 and begin working on the enclosed items.  
Once you open Envelope 2, please do not refer back to any items in Envelope 1.  




We understand that the information provided to you in this case is incomplete and might not 
include all of the facts that you would like to have available when answering these questions. 
However, we ask that you please provide your best professional judgment using the available 
information in the case. 
Indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements about the 
auditors who received audit deficiencies in the internal quality review memorandum: 
The auditors received audit deficiencies due to their ability as an auditor 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
 
The auditors received audit deficiencies due to bad luck 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
 
The auditors received audit deficiencies due to the riskiness of their client 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
 
The auditors received audit deficiencies due to lack of effort 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
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Place a check mark on the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, 
qualities, and values align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of the auditors 




Place a check mark on the picture below that best describes how your personal attributes, 
qualities, and values align or overlap with the attributes, qualities, and values of the auditors 




Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement:  
The real office I work at in my audit firm is identical to what I consider an ideal office.  
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
                                                               
 
 
      
 
 





                                                               









Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements: 
Applying the issues identified in the internal quality review (IQR) memorandum to my own 
work would help me avoid receiving an IQR audit deficiency more than ignoring the issues 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
Applying the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum to my own work 
would not help me perform a substantially better audit than ignoring the issues 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
The audit deficiencies identified in the internal quality review memorandum pose an 
unacceptably high risk of audit failure (i.e. the issuance of an incorrect audit opinion) 
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
It is important to address the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum.  
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
Addressing the issues identified in the internal quality review memorandum is more about 
complying with reviewers than improving audit quality  
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
Receiving an audit deficiency in an internal quality review reveals a lot about the quality of the 
work performed by the auditor under review  
Strongly Disagree        Neither Agree nor Disagree            Strongly Agree 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100  
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The internal quality review memorandum discussed review results from engagements at ______. 
a. Your office 
b. A different office 
 
The internal quality review memorandum discussed review results from engagements that were 




Indicate which audit areas were discussed in the internal quality review memorandum: 
 Inventory 
 Revenue 
 Deferred tax assets 
 Intangible assets 
 Goodwill 
 Accounts Receivable 
 
What do you think is the likelihood that the current year Cool Beans engagement will be subject 
to an internal quality review during the next year?   
Extremely Unlikely        As Likely As Not         Extremely Likely 
 
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 






Indicate how many months you have worked in assurance services: 
 |---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------| 
  0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90        100 
 
Indicate how many times you have prepared audit working papers for an accounting estimate:  
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
   0         3         6         9         12       15        18        21       24        27       30+ 
 
Indicate how many times you have reviewed audit working papers for an accounting estimate: 
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
  0         3         6         9         12       15        18        21       24        27       30+ 
 





 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
 





 0         10         20         30         40         50         60         70        80         90       100 
You have now completed the study.  
Please place this packet in Envelope 2 and give both envelopes to the experimenter.  














































APPENDIX C: IRB LETTER 
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